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CARBON EMISSION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: STATE PATCHWORK VS. 
NATIONAL POLICY 
By Samuel T. Frank 
Advisor: Professor John Seley 
 
The lack of a national law in the United States to mitigate climate change has prompted many 
states and cities to take the lead in implementing policies to reduce their carbon emissions and 
adapt to the threats posed by a warming planet. This project adopts two established systems that 
classify states by their relative involvement in climate policy (Wheeler 2010; Lutsey et al. 2008) 
and combines them into a single, six-point ranking scale. States are then cross-tabulated against 
EPA data showing the amount and trajectory of each state’s carbon emissions from the electrical 
power sector over the period 2005-2010. States with unexpected results—i.e. states with high 
climate policy scores but whose emissions surprisingly increased, and states with low climate 
policy scores but whose emissions surprisingly decreased—are selected as case studies and 
analyzed further. The project identifies specific factors such as changes in the use of coal or 
biomass to generate electricity, membership in regional cap-and-trade programs, local 
environmental conservation laws, and economic downturn that are critical—but not exclusive—
to determining whether a state’s emissions will rise or fall. The findings show the U.S. has a 
patchwork of climate policies with varying abilities to cut emissions. States often function as 
“policy laboratories” for implementing new regulations that might serve as models for federal 
action (Pew 2005). The project concludes that a single, unified national policy to transition the 
power sector from coal and natural gas to renewable energy—either through a carbon tax or EPA 
regulations on power plants—would more efficiently cut emissions than the current hodgepodge 
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 The United States lacks federal legislation to address climate change, and states and cities 
are taking the lead by enacting policies to mitigate carbon emissions and adapt to the threats 
posed by a warming planet (Wheeler 2010). According to the United Nations’ Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—the leading international body of scientists and experts on the 
physical basis for climate change—ninety seven percent (97%) of scientists agree that Earth’s 
climate is warming faster than ever before in human history and that centuries of burning fossil 
fuels is the cause (IPCC AR4). In the U.S., however, years of bitterly divided politics and a 
concerted, ideologically-driven campaign to deny the reality of anthropogenic climate change 
has paralyzed policymakers from doing anything substantial on the national level about this far-
reaching threat (Klein 2009). In June 2013, recognizing that a deadlocked Congress will not 
move on the issue, President Obama announced that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
will begin to cut the amount of carbon the U.S. releases into the atmosphere by putting in place 
new emissions standards for vehicles and power plants (Landler 2013). While this is a welcome 
development, it is the federal government’s long-overdue first step in a years-long process; in the 
meanwhile, state and local governments have been and continue to be at the forefront of climate 
change policy (Rabe 2004). Among the states, there is a wide range of engagement in climate 
change policies—New York, for example, bans the construction of new coal-fired power plants, 
while Texas continues to expand its coal-generated electricity—and the outcomes for emissions 
reduction vary widely from state to state (Stanton et al. 2010). The goal of this project is to 
identify states with emissions-cutting polices that work, and to understand how economic and 




States often function as “policy laboratories” for implementing new regulations that 
might serve as models for federal action (Pew 2005). This practice, known in the literature as 
“environmental federalism” (Burtraw 2011; Goulder et al. 2008), uses states as proving grounds 
for “social and economic experiments” (Peterson 2004, 93). But there is still a vigorous debate 
over the relative advantages and disadvantages of top-down versus bottom-up approaches to 
climate governance (Peel et al. 2012). On the one hand, the flexibility of a decentralized 
approach that can operate across multiple government levels can be an advantage. On the other 
hand, nationally and internationally coordinated regulations like a standardized cap-and-trade 
system can more efficiently cut emissions (Ibid). This project will argue that, even though the 
bottom-up, state-by-state patchwork approach predominates in the current policy environment, 
ultimately a set of nationally-led, top-down policies that coordinate with states and put a price on 
carbon pollution will be necessary to achieve the significant reductions in carbon emissions that 
serious climate change mitigation requires. 
 
The Current Policy Environment 
The policy divide (Wheeler 2010) between the federal government and the states has 
produced a patchwork of regulations for the power industry that is confusing to comply with and 
inefficient in reducing total carbon emissions (Lutsey et al. 2008). There is disagreement in the 
literature over which level of government can most effectively reduce emissions from coal-fired 
power plants, the nation’s single largest stationary source of carbon dioxide (Goulder et al. 2008; 
Peterson 2004; Burtraw 2011). State action on climate change has increased in recent years in 
response to a lack of federal leadership to reduce GHG emissions (Pew 2005). This action has 




carbon allowances and reduce their emissions based on caps set by the regional authority. The 
case studies in this project include states that participate in cap-and-trade programs, as well as 
“observer” states that acknowledge the need to reduce emissions but have not yet legally 
committed to do so, and non-participating states that reject climate change policies on political or 
economic grounds.  Since the U.S. still does not have a federal law that reduces emissions (Peel 
et al. 2012), the new push by the EPA to limit CO2 from new power plants is an attempt to 
address this policy gap. But the state level is still where most of the action is happening for 
climate change policy, and therefore the main subject area for this project. 
While there are often significant tradeoffs and potential overlaps in these different 
approaches to climate policy, continued failure at the federal level to pass climate legislation has 
made lawmakers more skeptical of top-down approaches: “as one legislative director in the 
United States Senate put it after the advent of the 104th Congress, ‘there’s no more legislating on 
the cheap—from now on it all has to be done the hard way, from the grass roots up’” (Peterson 
2004, 90). However, state-by-state and regional approaches are often inadequate in producing the 
large-scale impact required for a global problem on the level of climate change. This project uses 
states from both the high and low ends of the policy spectrum as comparative case studies in 
order to understand the current divisions in American carbon emission policy.   
These divisions, driven in part by heated political rhetoric at the federal level, make any 
consensus on climate change policy elusive. Ironically, however, state and local policies have 
benefitted from a kind of political cover provided by the presumption that they have neither 
incentives nor resources to play a serious role in shaping policy (Rabe 2004; Peterson 2006).  
This national and international focus has diverted attention away from local efforts: “Many 




communities have essentially ignored what states were doing and instead assumed that the real 
action was occurring in Washington, D.C., or other various cities—from Kyoto to Bonn—where 
periodic rounds of international diplomacy were being played out” (Rabe 2004, 23).    
Different levels of government often have inconsistent or contradictory policies for how 
to deal with mitigating climate change. Regulations meant to reduce carbon emissions from coal-
fired power plants are a good example of this. Since its first attempts in 2008, Congress has 
failed to pass a cap-and-trade bill that would create a national standard for emissions reductions 
from power plants.  Under the first Obama administration, the EPA put in place a new rule to 
limit carbon dioxide emissions from new power plants to 1,000 pounds per megawatt-hour.  
Some coal-reliant states like West Virginia unsuccessfully challenged the rule in federal court 
(Broder 2012). Meanwhile, other more “green” states are increasing their emissions standards 
under regional authorities like the Northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI).   
There are various ways to measure the effectiveness of emissions reduction policies—
such as level of coordination and participation between and among states, economic impact or 
job creation—but this project uses the measurement of actual CO2 reduction as a percentage of 
total carbon emissions. This method is the most straightforward tool to assess the impacts of 
reduction policies implemented by different levels of government. In “Statehouse and 
Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy,” Rabe (2004) employs 
this method to analyze twelve states in terms of “state policy engagement (or lack thereof) on 
climate change, physical size and economic composition, levels of greenhouse gas emissions, 
geographical location, and partisan control” (xiv). While the methodology is limited to the two 




comparing a diverse range of states to each other and to an emerging but inchoate federal 
standard.   
 
Methodology 
 This project uses a combination of two systems that rank states by their relative 
involvement in climate change policy. The first system, derived from Lutsey et al. (2008), 
identifies “a consistent set of actions being undertaken by state governments” to engage in 
climate change policy.  The general order of these steps is 1) to create a state GHG emissions 
inventory, 2) to formulate an action plan, and 3) to initiate programs and regulations to achieve 
target reductions.  States that are just beginning to consider serious climate change policy begin 
by inventorying their GHG emissions.  States that are further along in the process set up action 
plans based on the statewide GHG inventory. Ultimately, these action plans can translate into 
tangible programs that legally obligate emitters to cut their emissions. Of course, there are also 
states that have chosen to opt out of this system entirely.  In the absence of a unified federal 
climate change policy, each of these steps occurs at different times for states and has produced a 
variety of responses and outcomes.   
 The second ranking system is based on Wheeler’s (2010) attempt to group all states into 
three categories—green, intermediate, and brown states—in terms of their political track record 
on climate change. The measurements used to categorize states into these three groups are: 1) 
votes on the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill passed by the House in 2009, 2) votes on the 
Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill considered by the Senate in 2008, and 3) participation in 
one of America’s three regional cap-and-trade agreements. Green states meet the following 




who voted for Waxman-Markey, and at least one Senator who voted for Warner-Lieberman.  
Conversely, brown states are not member of a regional cap-and-trade agreement, have less than 
half of House members voting for Waxman-Markey, with both Senators voting against Warner-
Lieberman.  Intermediate states fall somewhere in the middle along this spectrum.  According to 
Wheeler, these criteria yield the following pattern: 19 green states, 15 brown states, and 16 
intermediate states.   
 The two ranking systems above use a total of six independent measurements that reflect a 
state’s involvement in climate change policy. If a state meets all six of these criteria, we assume 
that it is active in addressing the dangers of climate change and possibly even successful in 
reducing its emissions. On the other hand, if a state meets none of these criteria, we can be fairly 
certain that it does not view climate change as a serious problem and that its emissions might be 
increasing. We therefore can assign a score—from 0 to 6—to each state in order to determine its 
relative level of climate change policy participation, and then compare those rankings to data 
showing actual levels of emissions reductions. We would expect that the states with the highest 
policy participation scores would also be the states with the largest emissions reductions.  
Moreover, we would expect the states with little or no policy participation to have the least 
amount of emissions reductions, and likely emissions increases.   
 
Cross-Validation 
Table 1 below shows all 50 states according to their scores on two ranking systems. The 
first system, derived from Lutsey et al. (2008), measures a state’s involvement in climate policy 
based on three policy actions: 1) GHG emissions inventory, 2) climate action plan, and 3) 




policy actions they take. The second system, derived from Wheeler (2010), groups all states into 
one of three categories: brown, intermediate, or green. Green states get 3 points and are defined 
by: 1) membership in a regional cap-and-trade agreement, 2) a majority of House members that 
voted for Waxman-Markey, and 3) at least one Senator that voted for Warner-Lieberman. Brown 
states get 0 points and are defined by: 1) no membership in a cap-and-trade agreement, 2) less 
than half of House members voting for Waxman-Markey, and 3) no Senators voting for Warner-
Lieberman. Intermediate states get either 1 or 2 points and have some but not all of the criteria 
















Table 1: Cross-Validation 
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As this is a non-statistical snapshot of the general climate policy landscape among the 
states in 2010, all six factors from the two ranking systems are weighted equally. This combined 
system provides a straightforward method for grouping the states by their extent of policy 




The resulting state groupings in the 3-by-3 table validate the methodology by showing 
that states can verifiably be grouped according to their level of involvement in climate policy. 
This confirms that the state rankings developed in this project are meaningful in that they are 
generally predictive of a state’s cohort of other states with similar policies. States in the 
Northeast and West Coast that are known to have robust climate policies occupy the lower-right 
grid cell and represent the highest policy scores. States in the Midwest and South that generally 
lack climate policies occupy the upper-left grid cell, representing the lowest policy scores. Most 
of the other states occupy the center column and have intermediate levels of climate policy. As 
further confirmation of the validity of this policy grid, very few states occupy the upper-right and 
lower-left cells. This makes sense intuitively since it is very unlikely for a state to belong to a 
cap-and-trade program and have a Congressional delegation that votes for national climate 
legislation, yet not have emissions regulation in place at home. It is similarly unlikely for a state 
to shun local climate action yet send representatives to Congress that vote for national climate 
policies.  
The purpose of the table, therefore, is to confirm the findings of Rabe (2004), Lutsey et 
al., Wheeler and others that it is possible to quantify a range of state climate policies and to 
assign a hierarchy among the states based on those values. This project joins this combined state 
ranking system to EPA data showing each state’s power sector carbon emissions during the 
2005-2010 period, and then selects exemplary and outlier states from both the high and low ends 
of the policy spectrum. The exemplary state from the high end of the spectrum is New York. The 
outliers from the high end of the spectrum are Oregon and Iowa. The exemplary state from the 
low end of the policy spectrum is Mississippi. The outliers from the low end of the spectrum are 




Justification and Alternative Methodologies 
 While the six-point scale this project uses is a novel approach for measuring the relative 
differences in climate policy at the state level, it is based on two well-known, widely cited works 
in the field that present models for gauging state climate policy (Lutsey at al. and Wheeler). The 
combined model employed in this project is by no means the only method for gauging these 
kinds of disparities, but it is directly rooted in established research and is easy to understand. The 
goal for this project is to create and apply a ranking system that encompasses the policies that 
each state implements internally and the degree to which each state is active in climate policy at 
the regional and national levels. The justification for using this set of metrics is straightforward: 
the points on the scale are unambiguous (i.e., each has a simple “yes” or “no” value) and they 
offer a meaningful accounting of the components of each state’s policy activity. In Lutsey et al., 
there is a clear, bottom-up hierarchy starting with states that have made the first basic step of 
creating a GHG emissions inventory, followed by states with a Climate Action Plan (CAP), and 
finally states with programs already in place to regulate emissions. In terms of quantifying state 
policy involvement, this 3-point scale is one of the measures the EPA uses to enforce flexible 
emissions standards on states. In Wheeler, the 3-tier system that classifies states into green, 
brown or intermediate groups uses regional and national political actions—like specific climate-
related votes by members of Congress and membership in regional cap-and-trade agreements—
to model regulatory disparities. The broad scholarly acceptance of these ranking systems (both 
papers are cited over one hundred times on Google Scholar), and the ease and symmetry with 
which they can be joined, make them appropriate metrics for this project. 
 Another method could have been to test the effects of climate policies not on the state 




published in Nature Climate Change titled “Effectiveness of US state policies in reducing CO2 
emissions from power plants” employs a methodology that uses newly released plant-level 
emissions data (Grant et al. 2014). This type of study can avoid large-scale generalizations by 
ignoring state borders and just focusing on point sources of emissions like power plants, and can 
differentiate between the effects policies have on reducing power plant emissions versus the 
effects policies have on encouraging energy efficiency and renewable energy. But one of the 
aims of this project is to use the diverse range of outcomes of emissions policy on the state level 
as a commentary on the lack of a national standard for carbon emissions. It is therefore more 
appropriate and feasible to use state-level data and not plant-level data, not to mention the fact 
that such detailed plant-level data only became available long after the data-collection phase of 
this project.  
Pace University School of Law (Jensen et al. 2014) has also compiled detailed 
information on state policy activity since the inception of this project that might have served to 
augment the ranking system for states by their emission inventories, climate actions plans, and 
existing regulations derived from Lutsey et al. The study, titled “The State Response to Climate 
Change: 50 State Survey,” is an exhaustive compilation of state legislation, rules and executive 
orders that specifically address climate change as of the end of April 2014 and provides a 
comprehensive look at the “range of state activity that may contribute to greenhouse gas 
reduction and climate change.” This survey could have added one or more categories to this 
project’s 6-point state ranking system. However, that may have overcomplicated the 
methodology by making the ranking system too unwieldy and by introducing categories that do 
not have simple “yes” or “no” values. For example, one can say definitively whether a state is or 
is not a member of a regional emissions trading program, but there is more gray area when one 




fuels or renewable energy use. Creating a “yes/no” system to evaluate questions like that for all 
50 states would be much more complicated and not feasible for this project. 
 
The Case Studies 
An analysis using this project’s 6-point policy scale yields a set of interesting anomalies 
and areas of further inquiry.  For example, a state with a high policy participation score but low 
emissions reductions might be subject to a variety of political, economic or environmental 
tradeoffs that are counteracting its efforts to cut emissions, such as economic growth outstripping 
gains in energy efficiency.  By contrast, a state that scores low on policy participation but has 
still had success in cutting emissions could be the result of changing economic or industrial 
practices, such as a growth in renewable energy production or a shift from mining to 
manufacturing.  This process of analyzing individual states’ emissions reductions in terms of 
their relative levels of policy participation will hopefully show where and how these kinds of 
policies are effective, and where and how they fail.  Simply putting a policy in place does not 
guarantee that it will work.  If we expect a certain level of change based on a policy outcome and 
it does not occur, we then need to look more deeply at the political, economic or environmental 
situation in that state to try to understand the abnormality.  This method therefore seeks to 
understand, both quantitatively and qualitatively, what works and what doesn’t work in the realm 
of climate change policy. 
 The process of ranking states by their policy involvement and gauging that measure 
against the change in states’ actual carbon emissions levels produces a range of ratios that show 
some expected and some unexpected results.  For example, New York ranks among the highest 




would expect emissions reductions to stem from policy actions taken by a state, and therefore the 
case for New York yields expected results.  We can look to factors in New York’s climate policy 
approach like participating in a regional GHG cap and trade program and its closing of coal-fired 
power plants as reasons for why its emissions have gone down.  On the other hand, a state like 
Oregon also has a high ranking for policy involvement but its emission levels have unexpectedly 
increased.  In this case, other factors like its use of non-carbon neutral biofuels and the 
conversion of a huge power plant from coal to biomass instead of natural gas can account for the 
rise in carbon output. 
 On the low end of the policy involvement spectrum, states with few or no climate change 
laws similarly show a range of expected and unexpected results.  Mississippi, for instance, scores 
a zero for policy involvement, ranks high among all states in terms of per capita energy 
consumption, and uses exceptionally high levels of coal to generate power.  As such it is not 
surprising to see its emissions levels are high and rising.  Conversely, states like Georgia, North 
Dakota and Tennessee that rank low on the policy involvement scale have emissions levels that 
are lower than expected or dropping.  This unexpected finding can be attributable to a diverse set 
of factors beyond the conventional measures of climate policy participation.  Having suffered 
intermittent years of drought in the recent past, Georgia has put water issues front and center in 
the state legislature, and the heightened awareness of local environmental impacts has translated 
into new efficiency standards for some sectors of transportation and industry.  The hydrofracking 
boom in North Dakota has allowed lower-carbon natural gas to supplant coal and oil as that 
state’s predominant fuel export, contributing to its unexpected drop in carbon emissions. 
Tennessee is also an interesting case because it is one of the few “red” states (ie. a state with 
local politics and politicians that would likely be against climate change policy) that produces a 




nuclear.  However, the decades-old Tennessee Valley Authority’s unique role in providing 
renewable energy to Tennessee and surrounding states, while it is an interesting case, is too 





























Basis for Climate Change 
 There is little doubt in the scientific community that intensive burning of carbon-based 
fossil fuels, started during the Industrial Revolution and growing ever since, has been the main 
source of excess anthropogenic carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (IPCC AR4 2007). Carbon 
dioxide, along with other gases like nitrous oxide and methane, creates a “greenhouse effect” by 
trapping heat radiated from the Earth’s surface within the atmosphere; the increased frequency of 
extreme weather events like severe heat waves, droughts and floods—the so-called loading of the 
“climate dice”—is linked to this trend in global warming (Hansen et al. 2012).  The term “global 
warming” has become something of a catchall phrase to describe a planet-wide phenomenon of 
rising average temperatures due to the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere. In reality, most 
regions on earth are warming, some are cooling, wet zones are getting wetter, dry zones dryer, 
the oceans are acidifying from the excess carbon dioxide in the air, and the deep oceans are 
absorbing unknown quantities of heat from the atmosphere. The glut of carbon dioxide that 
humans have added to the atmosphere over the last two centuries—the blink of an eye in 
geologic terms—has thrown the planet’s natural equilibrium out of balance. This surplus carbon 
is the main cause of increasing average global temperatures that scientists have directly observed 
since Charles Keeling began meticulously recording atmospheric carbon dioxide levels on 
Mauna Loa, Hawaii in 1958 (Keeling 1960).  In 2013, the average level of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere reached four hundred parts per million (400ppm), a level unrecorded on Earth since 
the Pliocene three million years ago and a new, ominous milestone in the story of human-




 Fossil fuels power everything from cars, buses, and trucks to huge ocean-going container 
ships and trans-continental cargo trains. Coal, oil, and natural gas are all significant energy 
sources for heating and cooling homes, manufacturing and distributing goods, and powering 
heavy industry. One of the primary and most essential applications for fossil fuels is generating 
electricity. Because the power industry still relies heavily on burning coal and natural gas, 
electricity generation accounts for about one third of total energy consumption in the U.S.—the 
transportation and industrial sectors each account for roughly one quarter of total energy 
consumption (Lawrence Livermore 2012). For the power industry in general, half of all 
electricity generated comes from burning coal and a third from burning natural gas (EIA 
Washington 1993). Coal- and gas-fired power plants comprise the single largest source of 
domestic carbon emissions (coal releases twice as much carbon when burned than gas), and are 
therefore an important area of study for policies aimed at cutting greenhouse gases.   
 The range of carbon emissions sources across the U.S. is vast and complex, and attempts 
to inventory and regulate such a diverse array of emitters are complicated. States like California 
and Washington are adopting advanced mileage and emissions standards for cars and trucks, 
while other states like New York are requiring their manufacturing sectors to become more 
energy efficient (C2ES 2011). These emerging strategies are critical to achieving large-scale 
emissions cuts at the state and national levels and have been studied in various forms in the 
recent literature (Ibid). However, this project attempts to identify policies that cut carbon 
emissions only from the power sector. Using this method, the case studies are limited to “point 






Geography and Climate Change 
 At its most basic level, the study of geography is the study of the interaction between 
society and nature and the ways in which they influence one another. Since the rise of 
civilization thousands of years ago, when technological advances made possible the shift from 
nomadic to sedentary lifestyle, societies have been shaped by the environments that surround 
them. The origins of agriculture and domesticated livestock, for example, lie in the wild species 
of plants and animals that occurred naturally in the regions where early farming developed 
(Diamond 1997). Examples also abound of societies transforming their environments. One 
theory says that early North Americans, after migrating from Asia across the Bering Strait 
12,000 years ago, drove large game animals to extinction because of hunting techniques that 
overwhelmed the natural defenses of such megafauna in relatively short order (Ibid). Nature 
helps shape human development, and the rapid growth of the global population over the past few 
centuries has had an increasing role in altering the natural world. With Earth’s growing 
population of over seven billion, and our ever-increasing appetite for fossil fuel energy, 
humanity is now a significant force in shaping the planet’s natural systems—especially the 
carbon and water cycles—by virtue of the sheer volume of waste products we put into the air and 
water (Gore 2006).  
The phenomenon of global climate change is the latest and by far the largest example of 
humans disrupting the equilibrium of the environment. But whereas in the past, when people 
polluted their local stream, pond or lake or their nearby forest, field or fishery, they had a choice 
either to remediate the problem or move away from the localized pollution. The problem of 
climate change is different. The climate system functions on the global scale, and almost all life 




and adapt to climate change, there is no longer the option of “jumping scales” (Smith 1992) to 
bypass the consequences of a locally contaminated environment. The affected environment in 
this case is the entire planet. And, as the saying goes, “we only have one Earth.”   
 
Climate Change as Market Failure 
 The scale of climate change is global, but the damage it causes is spatially uneven.  Since 
the environmental effects of burning centuries worth of coal, oil and gas—what economists refer 
to as “external costs”—are not factored into the fuel price, fossil fuel energy remains relatively 
cheap while carbon emissions have steadily risen (Victor 2009). The problem with burning fossil 
fuels, the root cause of global warming, is that the benefits are concentrated among those who 
profit from the sale and use of the energy produced, but the costs are spread out broadly and 
borne by society as a whole. Economist Nicholas Stern calls climate change “the greatest market 
failure the world has ever seen” (Benjamin 2007) because our global economic system has failed 
to incorporate the true costs of loading the atmosphere with manmade greenhouse gases into the 
actual price of fossil fuels. Costs for oil and coal companies are also kept low through 
government subsidies that prop up traditional, dirty energy producers and make it more difficult 
for renewable energy firms to compete. But the “fundamental failure” of the energy market, as 
Stern argues, is that “those who damage others by emitting greenhouse gases generally do not 
pay” (Ibid). It would be easy, therefore, to place most of the blame for global warming with Big 
Oil and the vast fossil fuel industry since they profit from digging up the carbon fuels that cause 
global warming. However, these energy producers are acting rationally in a market that rewards 
scale and efficiency but externalizes the costs associated with harm to human health and 




 In this economic context of rational actors in an open market, climate change is a global 
scale example of the “tragedy of the commons.” This theory—developed during the enclosure 
movement of 18th and 19th century England—accounts for how a common resource can be 
depleted over time by individuals acting in their self-interest. During that time, independent 
shepherds would share common grazing grounds for their flocks, but growth in demand for wool 
soon led to overgrazing of the common resource, which was contrary to the group’s long-term 
best interests. The fact that the resource was common to all, but owned by no one in particular, 
allowed each individual shepherd to exploit it beyond its sustainable limits.  In his famous essay 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), the ecologist Garrett Hardin argues that human 
population growth and self-motivated use of natural resources have led to the over-exploitation 
of the commons.  Individual freedom to use resources—and sometimes to exploit them—is often 
viewed as the enemy of the preservation of the commons. To use the old English example, if 
every shepherd is permitted to graze his sheep in the common pasture without limit, then the 
entire community of shepherds suffers from overly degraded grazing land.  In this formulation, 
the tragedy of the commons boils down to the core meaning of individual freedom. That is, a 
person’s freedom is not solely his or her ability to use and exploit resources to the maximum 
extent possible.  Rather, freedom can only be preserved by recognizing that, because all 
resources are ultimately shared, it is our collective obligation to prevent their destruction by 
avoiding a large-scale tragedy of the commons.   
 
Cap and Trade vs. Carbon Tax 
 The framing of climate change as a failure of the market to adequately price fossil fuel 




is a variety of tools policymakers can use to intervene in a market that is skewed to underprice 
dirty, carbon-based fuels, the two most common being “cap and trade” and “carbon tax” 
(Goulder et al., 2008). Carbon taxes control emissions by establishing a fixed price that polluters 
must pay, with high prices discouraging pollution. By contrast, cap and trade systems limit 
carbon emissions, leaving the market to determine the price for polluting.  Both approaches use 
market-based tools to marginally increase the price of dirty fuels, and therefore alter energy 
prices so that they better reflect the true “social cost of carbon.” The concept of social cost of 
carbon—a relatively new and still imprecise economic calculation—is an estimate in dollar terms 
of the damage associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year 
(Anthoff et al. 2013). It is intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in “net agricultural 
productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of 
ecosystem services due to climate change” (White House 2013). Policies that incorporate the 
social cost of carbon into overall energy prices can produce substantial emissions cuts while also 
revealing a broader, reality-based picture of the economic impacts of dirty energy. 
The first example of this kind of policy, cap and trade, is a program where energy 
producers—normally electric utilities—are given a limit to how many tons of carbon dioxide 
they are permitted to release from a given fossil fuel-fired power plant. The government 
regularly auctions off emissions permits to the power industry so that individual producers have 
an option to buy carbon credits if they go over the emissions limit. If a power plant exceeds its 
limit (its emissions “cap”) it is required either to invest in emissions reducing technology or buy 
permits to cover the difference. If a power plant does not exceed its cap, and still holds carbon 
credits that it bought at auction, it can sell them to another plant—the “trade” part—that has 
exceeded its cap. This type of market-based solution to the problem of artificially underpriced 




efficiency technology or incur a marginal cost; it incentivizes firms to emit less carbon by 
indirectly pricing it; and the market cap is adjustable and can come down over time (Tietenberg 
2003). But there are also serious drawbacks to cap and trade. The market that it creates is 
external to the energy industry itself, so much of the profits from permit trading are not 
necessarily reinvested in production and efficiency. The government generates revenue from 
auctioning off permits, but it is not clear that that revenue ultimately benefits consumers by 
offsetting their higher energy prices.   The program can be gamed and is vulnerable to bubbles 
and manipulation like any other market (Stavins 2001). 
 The main alternative to cap and trade is the carbon tax.  Some object to the term “tax,” 
and have in some instances renamed it “carbon fee with rebate” or some other euphemism. 
Similar to cap and trade, the idea behind the carbon tax is the recognition that the price of dirty 
carbon-based fuels is significantly lower than their social cost. Whereas a ton of coal or a barrel 
of oil is relatively cheap compared to other, “non-traditional” forms of energy, the cumulative 
effects that decades worth of burning non-renewable fossil fuels have had on the environment, 
human health, and infrastructure are far more costly than the nominal energy price suggests.  
Therefore, a marginal price increase for carbon-based fuels, with a rebate to taxpayers whose 
energy costs have risen, could go a long way toward correcting this market imbalance by 
fostering two major changes: first, it would level the playing field for renewable energy sources; 
second, it could potentially lower emissions by de-incentivizing further development of 
greenhouse gas intensive energy sources (Helm 2005).   
 The IPCC and the U.S. National Climate Assessment show that while cap and trade can 
be an effective, market-based policy tool to price carbon and lower emissions, the carbon tax can 




When comparing the two policy approaches, there is a tradeoff between price volatility and 
predictability of emissions cuts. For cap and trade, the processes of auctioning and trading 
carbon credits make for greater volatility in price due to the whims of supply and demand, but 
the cap makes the actual levels of emissions cuts more predictable. On the other hand, a carbon 
tax would add only a marginal increase to comparatively stable energy prices, but the overall 
changes to emissions levels achieved by this type of policy would be harder to predict (Goulder 
et al., 2008). 
 
Cap and Trade in Congress 
 In 2009, two Democratic members of the House of Representatives, Henry Waxman of 
California and Edward Markey of Massachusetts, introduced the “American Clean Energy and 
Security Act,” a cap and trade bill widely considered the “first time either house of Congress had 
approved a bill meant to curb the heat-trapping gases scientists have linked to climate change” 
(Broder 2009). The bill proposed a basic cap and trade system, modeled in part on the European 
system, where companies buy and sell permits for greenhouse gases and the government sets a 
cap on the number of permits sold. Over time the government eventually lowers the cap in order 
to reduce total carbon emissions. The bill set targets for electric utilities to meet renewable 
energy standards, created subsidies for clean energy technologies, and protected consumers 
against large energy price increases, all while it allocated 85% of total allowances to the industry 
for free and auctioned off the remainder (Stone 2009). There was significant industry input and 
giveaways included in the bill to increase its chances of being passed in the House, and broad 
support for using national legislation to address climate change. Media reporting on the bill at the 




legislation reflects a series of concessions necessary to attract the support of Democrats from 
different regions and with different ideologies. In the months of horse-trading before the vote 
Friday, the bill’s targets for emissions of heat-trapping gases were weakened, its mandate for 
renewable electricity was scaled back, and incentives for industries were sweetened” (Broder 
2009). But criticism over the costs and uncertainty about the bill’s long-term benefits, coming 
mainly from conservative Republicans and right-wing think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, 
made the vote in the House extremely close. The narrow margin with which the Waxman-
Markey bill passed the House surprised many of those engaged in the negotiations, including 
then-White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel (Roberts 2010).   
 While the passage of the Waxman-Markey bill in the House was a watershed event in the 
fight to address climate change through national legislation, the unexpected victory quickly 
became merely symbolic when the U.S. Senate refused even to hear the bill—a moot point since 
it was clear the bill did not have the votes needed to pass the Senate.  In his book “The Climate 
War,” Eric Pooley goes deep into the internal debates and complex politics—for members of 
Congress, White House strategists and President Obama himself—involved in backing a climate 
change bill and “green” legislation in general. When the White House declined to help Rep. 
Waxman marshal the votes needed to get the cap and trade bill out of committee, it did so not out 
of opposition to a climate bill per se, but instead because of a simple political calculation based 
on the bill’s potential success or failure in a deeply divided Congress. As Pooley describes it, “if 
Waxman couldn’t win a simple committee vote without Obama’s help, no amount of presidential 
jawboning would carry the day. But his formulation threatened to become yet another climate 
Catch-22: The White House wouldn’t engage unless the votes were there, but the votes wouldn’t 
be there unless the White House engaged” (ibid). The votes needed to push the bill through to the 




profile backing of the bill at the same moment that it was ramping up its efforts to pass the 
Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare), would only serve to energize the climate change denier 
community and anti-Obama conservatives in general. Passing the cap and trade bill was therefore 
such a political challenge that in the end it failed, but at the very least it proved that the concept 
was workable with industry and government cooperation in the House, and made history by 
becoming the first piece of legislation passed by either house in Congress to acknowledge 
climate change and place mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
State and City Climate Action 
 In the absence of national legislation that limits carbon emissions or mandates energy 
efficiency, states and cities have taken the lead on a wide range of policies geared toward climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. In 2008, nearly a dozen New England and Mid-Atlantic states 
formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced “Reggie”) to reduce GHG 
emissions from power plants through a cap and trade system. RGGI was a first-of-its-kind 
regional program among a group of states that auctioned emissions permits and created a market 
for the power industry to trade permits. Auction proceeds are generally used to fund energy 
conservation and renewable energy programs, though some states have also used auction money 
to balance their overall budgets (RGGI.org). While the program has been successful in keeping 
power plant emissions low and demonstrating the practicality of a permit trading system, one of 
its main drawbacks is the difficulty of assigning the proper cap for total emissions within the 
system as a whole. Because of recent slow economic growth and lower natural gas prices due to 
the growing prevalence of hyrdofracking, power plant emissions in the Northeast have already 




emissions levels, and as a result the price of emissions permits came in at the minimum, or “floor” 
level. In February 2013, RGGI made a major overhaul of the emissions cap by lowering it 
significantly, thus bringing it in line with actual power industry emissions levels and raising the 
value of carbon permits. Other examples of regional cap and trade programs include the Western 
Climate Initiative and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. 
 New York City has also made significant steps to cut emissions, promote energy 
conservation and efficiency, and create city-wide plans to adapt to climate change threats like 
warmer summers and winters, coastal erosion and sea level rise. In 2007, Mayor Bloomberg and 
the City government introduced PlaNYC 2030 to deal with the challenges that population growth 
and climate change will present to the city’s transportation, housing, water, and energy 
infrastructure in the coming decades. The citywide plan recognizes that “Climate change poses 
significant risks to New York City’s communities and infrastructure. Hurricane Sandy has 
focused attention on the effects that extreme weather events have on New York City, reminding 
New Yorkers that the city is vulnerable to a range of climate-related hazards today and in the 
future” (PlaNYC 2013). New York City’s plan to reduce its carbon footprint while adapting to 
current and future risks of heat waves, sea level rise and other impacts is one of the largest—but 
by no means the only—local efforts to deal holistically with the problem of climate change. 
 
Other Factors that Contribute to Cutting Emissions 
 The wide range of policies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions by effectively putting a 
price on carbon can create a more level playing field for renewable energy sources to compete.  
A carbon tax directly adds to the price of a given unit of fossil fuel-generated electricity by 




atmosphere. The U.S. and other countries have attempted to capture this figure by calculating the 
so-called “social cost of carbon” which, as noted above, is a comprehensive estimate of 
economic damages associated with a small increase in carbon dioxide emissions, conventionally 
one metric ton, in a given year (EPA 2013). The social cost of carbon is an acknowledgement of 
the fact that energy from coal and oil is relatively cheap partly because the indirect costs to 
society of burning them—i.e. the environmental, health and economic impacts of climate 
change—are treated as external costs and therefore are not reflected in the price. Placing a fee on 
emissions, coupled with a rebate to consumers to defray marginal increases in energy costs, is 
one strategy that could correct this market shortcoming. 
 Cap and trade also puts a price on carbon that the traditional market fails to do, only it 
does so indirectly and with more flexibility. The major difference between the two approaches is 
that a cap and trade system only sets the limit for the amount of carbon emitted and allows the 
market to float the price for emissions permits. The actual price for emissions is more predictable 
in a carbon tax scenario, but cap and trade allows for more predictability in the number of tons of 
carbon cuts (Goulder et al., 2008).   
[See Literature Review for further discussion on cap and trade vs. carbon tax]. 
 Apart from the two most prominent policy tools meant to cut emissions by placing a price 
on carbon, there is a host of other factors that can have a strong impact on emissions levels. As 
we have seen recently in the U.S. and elsewhere, economic slowdown has been a contributing 
factor to emissions reductions by lowering demand for electricity and thus reducing energy 
sector output (IEA 2014). This may help cut emissions, but it is bad for families and job seekers 
trying to survive in a weak economy. In the realm of climate change mitigation, the goal is to 




production. Therefore, to identify economic slowdowns and recessions as factors that can curb 
emissions is obviously not ideal and potentially counterproductive in the fight against climate 
change. Ultimately, carbon-pricing policies will flip this arrangement so that lower industrial 
carbon emissions will mean faster economic growth; but this will require equal footing for all 
energy producers and the abolishment of unfair government subsidies for the fossil fuel industry.  
Regardless of the undesirable reality that economic slowdown reduces carbon emissions, it will 
remain an important factor to keep in mind in order to assess its role in climate change mitigation.   
 On the other side of the spectrum, energy efficiencies for everything from home 
appliances to cars to power plants have had significant roles in cutting emissions. Many of these 
gains in efficiency have occurred either voluntarily or through state or locally mandated 
regulations, and on the whole have positively linked emissions reductions to cost savings and 
better business practices.   
 Another factor in reducing carbon emissions has been the rapid growth over the past 
decade of a technique for extracting natural gas from deep shale rock formations.  This process 
of large scale hydraulic fracturing—or “hydrofracking”—involves deep, horizontal drilling 
coupled with high pressure water, chemicals and abrasives that fracture bedrock to extract 
methane and other hydrocarbons. The impacts of cheap natural gas from hydrofracking on 
energy markets and carbon emissions rates have been huge for a variety of reasons. First, the 
technique itself has existed for decades, but has only recently become sufficiently cheap and 
prevalent to make it economically viable at a scale large enough to have a market-wide economic 
impact. Second, when burned, natural gas emits about half as much carbon dioxide as coal, so 
the growing share of gas as a substitute for coal in the American energy market has contributed 




exploration and extraction in North America (Canada is also investing heavily in hydrofracking 
and other non-traditional petroleum operations, most notably the Northern Alberta Tar Sands 
megaproject), and has therefore sparked a new race to develop domestic oil and gas fields.  The 
allure of energy independence—albeit for fossil fuels—has been a boon for hydrofracking, and 
has allowed its proponents to argue for its virtues without seriously weighing its substantial vices. 
 It is not surprising, therefore, that the main arguments against hydrofracking have been 
muffled by those seeking to profit from its recent exponential growth. The three main opposing 
arguments to hydrofracking boil down to these: methane leakage, local environmental damage, 
and fossil fuel Trojan horse. The term “leakage” signifies a percentage of extracted natural jgas 
that escapes from the drilling apparatus into the atmosphere before it can be collected. Leakage is 
a serious concern for hydrofracking because methane is twenty times more potent than carbon 
dioxide as a greenhouse gas. There is also very little reliable data showing the actual amount of 
leaked methane from hydrofracking operations nationwide. Without such data, it is impossible to 
know whether emissions cuts—achieved by switching from coal to gas—are offset by the 
warming effects of hydrofracked methane leaked into the atmosphere. Hydrofracking also 
creates a host of local environmental problems such as contaminating underground water tables 
with drilling chemicals, adding to surface pollution with large “tailing ponds” filled with 
hazardous drilling byproducts (sometimes containing radioactive materials), and also infiltrating 
drinking water supplies with natural gas. The 2010 movie “Gasland” documented many of these 
adverse local effects of hydrofracking.  In one memorable scene, a western Pennsylvania woman 
hears the hiss of gas as she turns on her kitchen faucet, and then ignites it with a cigarette lighter 




Beyond the acute issues of leakage and local environmental impacts, the view that cheap 
natural gas is a solution to the emissions problem, rather than a bridge to truly clean, renewable 
energy, can lull the public into a dangerous mindset that exploiting “cleaner” fossil fuels can 
adequately address climate change. In terms of climate change, fewer carbon emissions are 
always better than more, and the transition from coal to gas can be a step in the right direction.  
But we must be careful to frame hydrofracking as a bridge between a dirty energy past and a 
clean energy future; it is a means to achieving lower emissions, not an end in itself.   
 
The EPA and the Clean Air Act 
 Over the past decade, Congress has tried and failed on multiple occasions to pass national 
legislation to limit carbon emissions from major sectors of the economy like transportation, 
energy and manufacturing. The 2007 Lieberman-Warner bill in the Senate and the 2009 
Waxman-Markey bill in the House are two examples of such legislation that saw early and 
unexpected success, but ultimately failed to pass both houses. As a result of this congressional 
inaction, the responsibility to cut emissions has mainly shifted from the federal government to 
the states; and as we will see, there is a wide spectrum of policies and regulations (or lack thereof) 
that different states have adopted to address the threats of climate change. But the federal 
government still plays a role in regulating carbon emissions through the EPA.  Since 2007, its 
authority to regulate carbon emissions has been challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court.  
The rulings in two significant cases—Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, and 
Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.—held that the EPA has the authority under the 
1970 Clean Air Act to regulate heat-trapping gases in automobiles and stationary sources like 




EPA (under the second Bush administration at the time) for doing nothing more than providing a 
“laundry list of reasons not to regulate,” and that the agency had defied the Clean Air Act’s 
“clear statutory command” to protect public health (Ibid).  
The ruling also included a Supreme Court directive to the EPA to decide whether carbon 
dioxide is a pollutant as defined by the Clean Air Act; that is, a threat to public health. After an 
extended legal evaluation process, in late 2009 the EPA (now under the Obama administration) 
finally issued an “endangerment finding” that classified CO2 as a harmful pollutant, which 
compels the EPA to regulate it under the Clean Air Act. A major goal of this new regulation was 
to formalize the existing trend in the power industry of a drop in new construction of coal-fired 
power plants.  The New York Times quoted Michael Brune, executive director of the Sierra Club, 
commending the rule that would end coal-fired generation as it now exists: “It’s a rule that 
follows the marketplace,” he said, adding: “Right now, next to no coal plants are being built. 
This basically means that new coal plants are going extinct” (Barringer 2012). But in order to 
open an avenue to companies still planning to build coal plants, the E.P.A. said it would allow 
new ones to begin operating with higher levels of emissions as long as the average annual 
emissions over a period of 30 years met the standard (Ibid). 
 The move by the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide prompted a set of fourteen, mainly 
conservative states led by Virginia and Texas, to sue the EPA to block implementation of its new 
rules. Fifteen states, including New York, California and Massachusetts, went to court to support 
the agency (Wald 2012). In June 2012, in major victory in the fight to combat climate change, a 
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
endangerment finding of the EPA that heat-trapping gases do in fact endanger public health 




grant an appeal, has now opened the way for the EPA to put rules in place to limit emissions 
from cars and power plants, two of the largest sources of carbon pollution in the U.S. New 
lawsuits have been filed since this latest court ruling, but in June 2013 all of this regulatory 
action culminated in a major policy speech by President Obama that now sets the course for the 
EPA to consult with states over how best to write and implement the new rules. The President 
acknowledged that laws passed by Congress would be preferable to regulation by the executive 
for such important, far-ranging issues like carbon emissions and climate change; but he rightly 
argued that EPA action was the next best alternative and would be necessary to achieve national 
climate goals.  In 2015 at the time of this writing, the process continues to play out. 
 
Environmental Federalism Background 
The historical concept of federalism in the United States contrasts sharply with the 
current system of centralized political power, in which the national government delegates powers 
to states and local municipalities. Under federalism, power emanates from the state rather than 
from the national government. This "delegation model" is typical of many of today’s 
environmental regulations, especially the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan (EPA 2013). 
Federalism has a wide range of advantages over a single sovereign government that can 
sometimes be slow to implement policies. The theory compels states to compete for people and 
resources by providing the regulatory environment that people are more closely connected to and 
in which citizens more actively participate. Lower levels of government tend to tailor their 
policies and programs to the demands of their constituents.  
Federalism permits policies to be set at a level where citizens can better monitor and 




difficult for national politicians, who are farther removed from their constituents. Decentralized 
policy making also offers competing states the opportunity to benefit from a common market 
without interstate trade barriers. Furthermore, federalism allows for national control where 
necessary. Under the Articles of Confederation written at the nation’s founding, the states found 
that a weak national government whose funding depended on voluntary contributions from the 
states was incapable of providing some important services, including national defense and the 
conduct of foreign policy (Shaw 1996). Some of the states were getting away with being "free 
riders" by failing to make their individual contributions. The founders faced a dilemma over 
deciding how to give the national government the power to overcome these "free rider" problems 
without risking the creation of another pseudo-monarchy that could abuse its centralized power 
(Haddock 1997). 
The system of federalism established in the Constitution generated substantial economic 
growth. However, it also contained the seeds of its own demise by gradually increasing the 
demand for national control (Haddock 1996). As people, goods, services, and pollution crossed 
state boundaries, there was an increasing need for uniform national regulations. By the early 
twentieth century, centralization of power at the national level was becoming the norm. There 
was a set of factors that allowed for power to be shifted to the national government. These 
factors included the large peacetime standing army that remained in place after the Civil War, the 
Supreme Court insinuating national authority over local affairs under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, and the New Deal emerging out of the Great Depression, once of the greatest challenges 
the federal government ever faced (Ibid). 
The federal government during this period also became the owner of large tracts of lands 




This land retention policy in the West gave policymakers in Washington enormous power over 
how to use these public lands. It is not surprising, therefore, that politicians and bureaucrats in 
Washington today are disinclined to relinquish the power they have accumulated over this 
century. Centralization can be rationalized on the grounds that top-down policy implementation 
covers more area and is technically more efficient than the bottom-up alternative (Nelson 1995). 
There may be instances where pollution crosses state borders or where water use in one state 
affects downstream states. But centralization clearly comes with high costs. For example, it 
reduces the ability of states to act as “policy laboratories” and limits the options for experiments 
with alternative policies. Concentrated policymaking instead generates "one-size-fits-all" 
regulations that may be appropriate for some places but not for others (Pew 2005). It also curtails 
the ability of citizens to monitor their governments. As decisions become further removed from 
constituents, it is more difficult to know whether political decision makers are acting in the 
public interest or on behalf of special interests. Because citizens cannot easily "vote with their 
feet" by moving to a different jurisdiction, the national sovereign government is in a position to 
abuse its power. Centralization in government is like monopoly power in markets; it reduces the 
options of citizens and raises the cost of services (Peterson 2004). 
A decentralized federalist system offers ways to reduce these costs by providing space for 
experimentation with different policies, by making it easier for citizens to monitor their political 
leaders, and by giving people alternative scales of government from which to choose the policies 
they see as beneficial to themselves and to society. Privatization of decisions can reduce these 
costs even further, but as long as resources are in a "commons," and therefore subject to abuse, 
some governmental control is necessary (Hardin 1968). The following principle should therefore 
serve as a guide to environmental federalism: To minimize the costs and maximize the efficiency 




that also allows for control of pollution or other spillover effects. Though environmental policy 
in the past three decades has been mostly dictated from Washington, there is a rich history of 
success among the states in addressing and ultimately solving resource and environmental 

























3: Literature Review 
 
Environmental Policy 
 The framework of this project is based on the critical literature of US environmental 
policy, specifically studies that assess the varying roles of local, state, and federal government in 
implementing environmental regulations. Byrne et al. (2007) reviews the diverse policies, 
strategies, and cooperative frameworks that have emerged at local, state, and regional levels to 
guide climate protection, and identifies the environmental and economic benefits linked to such 
programs. This work and others (Rabe 2002; Peterson et al. 2006; Thorp 2004) also attempt to 
explain the existing federal impasse on climate policy legislation. Some of these studies argue 
that sub-national efforts by the states may ultimately obviate national governmental action.  
Other works such as Kousky et al. (2003) examine what motivates municipalities to put in place 
policies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, when the theory of “free-riding” would predict 
that local administrations should find it difficult to unilaterally reduce their emissions for the 
benefit of the global climate.   
The environmental law scholar McKinstry has also identified states, localities and private 
parties as emerging sources for climate change mitigation policy. The 2004 article in the Penn 
State Law Review argues that while the federal government has withdrawn from “active 
engagement in the global response to climate,” the US has not halted all response to the issue. In 
fact, “it has simply moved the locus of the response from the federal government to the state and 
local governments and the private sector… state leadership in environmental issues has been the 
rule rather than the exception” (McKinstry 2004). The article goes on to highlight state-run 




Local Environmental Initiatives—that have taken the lead in creating and implementing policy 
where normally the federal government would assume that role.   
 
Significant Value to Field of Study 
 This project aims to contribute to the field of applied climate policy studies in at least 
three ways. First, the ranking system methodology seeks to validate the accuracy and usefulness 
of two existing systems (Lutsey et al 2008; Wheeler 2010) that gauge state climate action using 
specific policy measurements. Researchers make many different assumptions in evaluating the 
effectiveness of emissions reduction and renewable energy policies; for example, a policy might 
be seen as effective if it successfully reduces emissions, is replicated by other states, or both. The 
goal of this project is to create a basic quantitative system to understand the variation in climate 
policies across all 50 states, and to be able to use qualitative analysis to show the differences in 
policy outcomes among the outlier states. Second, the project attempts to add more examples to 
the “case study approach” using states as the basic unit for policy evaluation. This is a theoretical 
framework that Rabe (2004)—a critical, widely cited central work in the field—refined to show 
the growing importance of state level policy action in the absence of unifying federal climate 
legislation (discussed in further detail below). Finally, in recognition of the current landscape in 
which state climate actions are usurping the federal government, this project seeks to move 
forward the theory that states often work as “policy laboratories.” Whereas the federal 
government is traditionally slow in passing major policy reform, it is often easier for states to 
experiment with novel ideas for curbing emissions. States are therefore frequently used to test 
the viability and effectiveness of policies before they are introduced on a national level. This 




meaningful implications for how and why some states apply certain climate policies while others 
reject them. 
 
State Climate Action 
As mentioned above, one of the most influential and critical works in the field is Barry G. 
Rabe’s “Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy” 
(2004). This book assesses current climate change policy by focusing on the states, where most 
of the policy action has occurred over the last two decades. The book has four primary goals.  
The first is to introduce a “diverse set of innovative cases,” using different state policies to show 
how local and regional policies meant to combat global warming vary widely across the US.  
The author considers the full range of state government policies and uses a case study 
methodology for numerous states to understand this diversity of responses. Second, the book 
offers explanations for why states’ policy responses to the climate change problem have been 
substantial, while so far relatively little public attention has been paid to this state-level 
phenomenon. Far from having a uniform response to the challenges posed by climate change, the 
realities of federalism in the U.S. have shown that policymaking with a global focus is “alive and 
active in many state capitals.” Third, the book addresses the lack of policy innovation at the 
federal level and places that fact within the larger reality of political gridlock at the national scale.  
By contrast, many states that vary in partisan control from left to right have actually done more 
(with fewer resources) than their federal counterparts to create policy that reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions. Finally, the book attempts to show that focusing attention on “action” rather than 
the seemingly never-ending political process will ultimately yield results. Most of this action, 




commentators.” Therefore, a central focus of this project is to highlight areas where state and 
local policies are having success in reducing emissions.   
Many of the works mentioned above speak to the importance of regulating our power 
industry in order to bring our carbon emissions levels under control. In the United States, 
electricity generation is our single biggest source of energy consumption. The majority of that 
power is generated by power plants that burn fossil fuels, especially coal. Carbon dioxide 
exhaust from these facilities is consequently the U.S.’s single largest source of atmospheric 
carbon emissions (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories). As the U.S. grapples with 
accepting and implementing climate change policy, any serious national effort will have to start 
with regulating coal-fired power plants. 
As other studies have shown (Rabe 2004; Peterson 2006), a case study method focusing 
on state and regional programs is well suited to examining the diversity of climate change 
policies. This project will follow a similar methodology. Given the lack of leadership and 
direction from the federal government in formulating a coherent climate change policy that 
systematically reduces carbon emissions—apart from the new EPA rule—a patchwork of 
policies has emerged from the states in response to the public’s desire for action (Byrne et al. 
2007).  Rabe, in his comprehensive series of case studies, lays out the broad spectrum of states’ 
policy responses: 
These cases demonstrate a range of responses, reflecting tremendous state-by-
state variance.  On the one hand, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin have addressed the climate change issue with vigor, developing a 
series of reduction policies and demonstrating a level of policy sophistication that 
may rival the staunchest European nations supporting the Kyoto Protocol.  On the 
other hand, states such as Louisiana have proved largely indifferent – despite the 
vast potential threat from anticipated sea-level rise – whereas still others, such as 
Michigan, have taken steps to deter state officials from taking any action to 




these camps, although the clear national trend is toward greater state action.  
(Rabe, xiii). 
The case study method is used in Rabe’s book not only to look at successful policies, but also as 
a means to study the full range of policy responses states employ. A correlation between states’ 
climate change policies and reductions in their carbon emissions can lead to meaningful 
conclusions about what types of policies are most successful.   
 
Policy Implementation  
 Research over the past decade shows that states and local governments are leading the 
way on climate change policy innovation and are not waiting for guidance or leadership from the 
federal government. In a widely cited 2009 study titled “Climate Action Planning in the States: 
Structured Stakeholder Processes Show Stimulating Results” (Coburn 2009), Kenneth Coburn of 
the Center for Climate Strategies argues that state-level, stakeholder-based climate mitigation 
plans are becoming the norm in the United States. There are different methods of implementing 
policies – either through legislation, executive order, or some other form of regulation – but the 
most effective mechanisms are “policy-specific” and overcome concerns that specific sectors 
may be “unfairly targeted.” This study echoes the conclusions of many other works that analyze 
the implementation of complex public policies by showing how a successful policy must include 
the participation of a wide-ranging set of stakeholders. The involvement of as many stakeholders 
as possible is meant to increase the level of community engagement and offers a given policy the 
best chance for success. The more input a policy proposal gets from ratepayers, utilities, 
environmental groups, industry and others, the better chance it has to do well since it originated 
from a broad base of support. In terms of specific emissions-cutting policies, it is important to 




involvement also means that policy responses to threats from climate change can be complex due 
to significant state-by-state variation. Achieving emissions targets—a central goal for many 
climate policies—is critical for providing the highest added value.  A patchwork of non-uniform 
policies could result in varying degrees of economic growth and job creation, but the study 
ultimately concludes “to attain the lowest-cost solution overall, the integration of national and 
state actions is necessary” (emphasis added). Therefore, we can understand state and local 
climate policies as an important, but not final, stepping stone to a broader set of national – and 
hopefully international – policy solutions.  
 Another critical work in the field, “America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation 
policy” (Lutsey et al. 2008), makes a similar conclusion about the initial benefits of local 
emissions regulations that might ultimately be the basis for a national policy. This study argues 
that the broad scale of multiple, state-level mitigation actions is the “counterpoint to oft-cited 
drawbacks of decentralized environmental policy.” Due to the lack of movement in Congress to 
address climate change, the balance of environmental federalism has shifted toward states.  But 
this shift has exposed many of the benefits of decentralized regulation such as more 
experimentation, local tailoring of specific actions, testing of political response and the 
advantage of gaining local expertise. The drawbacks of decentralization, however, are also 
legitimate concern for a government attempting to put new policies in place. These downsides 
include creating an inefficient regulatory patchwork, policy duplication and waste, cross-
boundary mismatch between pollution sources and impacts, uneven policy performance (the so-
called dual problems of “shuffling” and “leakage”) and jurisdictional confusion. By using a 
methodology that weighs the effectiveness of using top-down versus bottom-up multi-
government activities, the study echoes Rabe (2004) in claiming that state action could help 




population states tend to have lower GHG-per-person intensities and are more likely to be active 
climate action states. This fact implies that states with active climate policies tend to be “Blue 
States,” i.e. states in the Northeast and West since these are predominantly the states with the 
largest and densest populations. States and regions have often led the policy charge, but this 
study like many others concludes that national initiatives are often more compelling than a 
patchwork of local initiatives. 
 
Evolution of Climate Policy 
 The history of climate change policy among the states has passed through many stages 
over the last thirty years, and the law article “The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in 
the United States. Lessons Learned and New Directions” (Peterson 2004) is a central work in 
chronicling its evolution.  In the 1990’s, the Kyoto Protocol (that the US signed but never ratified) 
included a number of tradeoffs involving long-term and potentially costly adjustments in energy 
policy that represented one of the first false starts in US-International climate accords. Many 
lawmakers found too many federal policy conflicts with the international climate change treaty.  
As a result, “lawmakers now adopt a more distant and skeptical approach toward environmental 
science, policy and representation” (Ibid p.90). The failure to adopt a national climate policy 
prompted many states to take the lead, and as Justice Louis Brandeis noted almost one hundred 
years ago, states often act as laboratories of “social and economic experiments” (Ibid p.93).  
Indeed, many regional initiatives originate in state programs and the goals and parameters of the 
regulation process may benefit from state by state variation. This study also makes a less tangible 




climate change is here to stay, and therefore policy solutions are becoming more urgent. The 
paper concludes that this is why multi-state and regional collaboration is important. 
 The Pew Center on Global Climate Change (now part of the Center for Climate and 
Energy Solution “C2ES”) also released a report in 2005 reiterating the relevant and well-known 
adage that states function as “policy laboratories.” It is easier to run policy experiments on the 
relatively smaller scales of states and cities, however there remains the potential inefficiency of a 
policy patchwork mentioned above in other works. States must take their long-term economic 
well being in mind, but addressing climate change could produce economic opportunities in 
terms of cost savings and energy efficiency. Any inefficiency in terms of inconsistent policies 
across state lines must be weighed against an array of these local economic advantages. In fact, 
many states are now implementing renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which require a 
percentage of a power plant’s capacity or generation to come from renewable sources by a given 
date. These kinds of flexible energy regulations are the products of state and local policy 
experimentation, and many of them are now serving as guidelines for new regulations the EPA is 
individually tailoring to each state.  
 
Economics of Climate Policy 
 As legislative efforts to introduce a price on carbon stalled in 2008 and 2009, the EPA 
started to use its authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 to create individual plans for 
states to mitigate carbon dioxide and other air pollution. An analysis by the Center for European 
Policy Studies (Burtraw 2011) focuses on policies at the sub-national level in order to gauge 
their actual effectiveness in cutting emissions. The interaction of these policies within the 




describes the three tools that EPA uses under the CAA to spur emissions reductions: vehicle fuel 
economy standards, “new source review” permits for new construction of stationary sources (ie. 
coal-fired power plants), and performance standards for existing sources. Not surprisingly, the 
study found that investment in new efficiencies for older power plants like retrofitting and 
combined generation are effective yet costly methods to reduce emissions.  This finding leads to 
the realization that the regions in the US with less efficient facilities—and therefore lower 
electricity generation per unit of fuel combusted—are those with lower coal costs.  Such lower 
efficiency from traditional coal power plants is a direct result not only of cheap coal prices, but 
also of a lack of regulation to limit emissions for a given amount of electricity generated.  This 
also indicates a strong response to fuel prices by the power industry as they fluctuate in response 
to the fierce competition occurring now between coal, natural gas from hydrofracking, and 
renewable sources like solar and wind that are becoming more cost effective. However, the study 
points out that there are still questions of how the EPA will accommodate state and regional cap-
and-trade programs within an overall national framework that aims to be flexible for individual 
states’ needs. Ultimately this points to the difficulties of the US financing its EPA climate 
change policies without comprehensive climate legislation. 
 These findings are bolstered by a similar study published in the journal Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy (Burtraw et al. 2011). The analysis is a further recognition 
that the lack of national legislation leaves the burden of near-term federal action on carbon 
emissions to the EPA to use its authority under the Clean Air Act. The irony is that the CAA is at 
“center stage” now, when for the past two decades policymakers’ attention was on incentive-
based approaches like cap-and-trade and carbon tax. This shift in focus—necessitated by the 
utter failure by Congress to move on any substantive legislation—brings into sharp contrast the 




sources. That is, comparing the overall effects of a tailored patchwork of policies versus an 
economy-wide national standard is critical for implementing the most effective climate change 
mitigation strategy. Since a national standard remains elusive, the EPA’s regulations under the 
CAA start with opportunities for efficiency improvements at existing sources, and then deal with 
incentivizing new plants to incorporate biomass co-firing/cogeneration to meet the new standards.   
 
Emissions Regulation 
 The policy patchwork that has come to define the current landscape of American efforts 
to mitigate climate change can also be compared to other parts of the world, particularly Europe, 
that have instituted large-scale emissions cutting rules. In “Confronting the American Divide on 
Carbon Emissions Regulation” (Wheeler 2010), the author contrasts the success of European 
Union policy and the failure of the attempted national U.S. policy. The EU cap-and-trade system 
functioned well because the European interregional disparity in carbon intensity is relatively 
small, while the compensating incentive has been huge. On the other hand, in the U.S., the 
interregional disparity in carbon intensity is huge, and compensating incentives are modest, 
therefore making the success of a national program that much harder to achieve. The implication 
is that an EU-style policy is not technically feasible in U.S. Therefore the methodology of this 
study is to break down the U.S. states into green and brown regions based on a state’s House 
votes for the Waxman-Markey bill, Senate votes for Warner-Lieberman, and participation in a 
regional cap-and-trade agreement. This system essentially equates U.S. states to EU nations and 
uses carbon emissions intensity as a proxy for the relative sensitivity to mitigation costs of a state 
or country. High levels of carbon intensity disparities among U.S. states means that national-




make the deepest emissions cuts. The study goes on to show that the carbon added tax (CAT) 
could undermine a cap-and-trade policy even in some Green States.   
 It is not straightforward, however, to know which mitigation policy is the best and most 
cost-effective for a state, region or country. In “Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy” 
(Goulder et al. 2008), the authors argue that competing normative criteria make selecting the best 
instrument an “art as well as a science.” Taxes are superior to alternatives such as cap-and-trade 
if they are priced at marginal external cost, but they are not as sophisticated or adaptable to 
changing circumstances as other instruments. The study demonstrates that there are significant 
tradeoffs involved in choosing the right instrument, and there is a marked disadvantage to 
heterogeneous regulation. Indeed there are a number of competing factors involved. For example, 
there is a contrast between incentive-based instruments like a carbon tax or cap-and-trade that 
can equalize emissions reductions costs across heterogeneous firms but are less political feasible, 
and direct regulatory instruments like technology mandates and performance standards that are 
more flexible but lack of information for regulators to tailor standards for individual firms. The 
role of uncertainty is also critical for policy performance; emissions cuts are uncertain under a 
tax, but prices are more predictable, whereas emissions cuts are more certain under a cap, but 
prices are more volatile. In addition, tradable allowance systems are more politically feasible, but 
they are poor in minimizing equilibrium costs and achieving household equity. The opposite is 
true for revenue-neutral emissions taxes. Ultimately the process of tailoring specific policies to 
the largest combined jurisdiction possible is the best compromise for regulating carbon emissions. 
 This tailoring process, however, is far simpler in theory than in practice for the basic 
reason that there is still a total disjuncture between climate change science and international 




Level Governance” (Peel et al. 2012), which argues that the highly fractured nature of 
democratic governments nowadays make it difficult to effectively implement broad-based 
emissions reductions policies. Top-down systems raise serious questions, while the bottom-up 
approach is in effect based on voluntary commitments and may not be that effective either. The 
alternative is a “multi-track” climate framework in which multiple levels of governance can 
contribute toward global goals of emissions reduction.  Considering the concern that national or 
sub-national action might lead to carbon leakage and competitive disadvantage, it is already 
taking place in cities and state across the country. They are taking advantage of a decentralized 
approach in their own self-interest because they feel they cannot wait for the slow pace of 
national action on climate change.   
 This push-and-pull between states and national regulators is a constant point of policy 
uncertainty, and has spurred a shift in command-and-control regulation to incentive-based 
regulation for electric utilities and other firms. Another study in this body of literature, “Growing 
state-federal conflicts in environmental policy: The role of market-based regulation” (Williams 
2011) finds that because of inter-state spillover, the federal pollution tax is more efficient than 
command-and-control policy or a tradable permit system. This finding essentially formalizes the 
individual state action that has been occurring repeatedly throughout the country, and makes 
clear that if the EPA eventually does institute a national standard it will have to do so with lots of 
flexibility and a very careful intention not to negate the progress states have already made.  On 
the other hand, a federal emissions tax—as an alternative to renewable portfolio standards for 






4: Methodology and Findings 
 
State Ranking Systems 
 The two ranking systems described in the Introduction each define three points of 
measurement for a state’s level of involvement in climate change policy.  A combination of these 
policy scales produces a single ranking system with a zero-to-six (0-6) scale that we can 
calculate for all fifty states (see table below). Through this relatively straightforward process, we 
can use what we know about the steps (or lack thereof) that state policymakers have taken to 
address climate change in order to assign an overall number to each state. As expected, what 
emerges is a wide spectrum of all fifty states where most of the high-ranking states—those that 
scored a 5 or 6—are states with more liberal politics and at least a nominal concern for 
mitigating and adapting to the impacts of climate change. On the other end of the spectrum, most 
of the low-ranking states—those that scored a 0, 1 or 2—are states that traditionally have more 
conservative politics and often, at least among politicians, a rhetorical hostility to acknowledging 











Table 2: 50 State Policy Rankings 
  
Involvement in State Climate 
Policy                                          yes 
= 1, no = 0 
Green, Intermediate, Brown State 
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(>0 = 1) 




Illinois 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Iowa 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Michigan 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Wisconsin 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Delaware 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Maine 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Maryland 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Massachusetts 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
New 
Hampshire 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
New Jersey 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
New York 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Rhode Island 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Vermont 1 1 0 1 1 1 5 
California 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
New Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
Oregon 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 




         
BROWN 
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
South Dakota 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Alaska 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
South 
Carolina 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
INTER-
MEDIATE 
Indiana 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Kansas 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pennsylvania 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Hawaii 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Florida  1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
North 
Carolina 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 




West Virginia 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Arizona 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Colorado 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 
Montana 1 1 0 1 0 1 4 
Nevada 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 
Utah 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
 
Table 2 above shows the scores for all 50 states in each of the 6 policy measures. The states are 
grouped into “green,” “brown,” and “intermediate” categories (Wheeler 2010) to show the 
overall policy similarities between them. By definition, “green” states will score at least 3 total 
points because they fulfill every state criteria on cap-and-trade membership and Congressional 
climate voting records. “Brown” states will score a maximum of 3 points because, by definition, 
they fulfill none of the state criteria. With the addition of scores for involvement in state climate 
policy (GHG inventories, state CAPs and emissions reduction goals), green states generally score 
either 5 or 6, brown states generally score 0 or 1, and intermediate states generally score 2, 3, or 
4. 
 
 Another way we can measure states is by ranking them according to their actual amounts 
of carbon emissions—both total amount, and from the electric power sector—a dataset that the 
EPA publishes annually for each state.  We can observe trends in this dataset, measured in 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide (MMTCO2), in order to gauge the fluctuation of individual 
state’s emissions levels year by year. We would expect that states with rising emissions levels 
are mainly those with few or no policies to curb this growth in carbon pollution (ie. low-ranking 




would by and large be those that have adopted pollution-cutting policies. The CO2 emissions 
dataset that this project uses shows annual change over the time period of 1990-2010.  However, 
the time period of 2005-2010 is of most interest here because it is the most current data available, 
does not extend farther into the past than is relevant for recent climate policies, and it coincides 
with the general time period in which most of the policies assessed in this project were enacted.  
The next step is to calculate the percent change—either positive or negative—in electric power 
emissions for each state from 2005 to 2010 so that we can see an overall recent trend for all 
states.   
 
Data Analysis 
 This multi-step process outlined above ultimately yields two key measures for all 50 
states. The first is a policy score, from 0 to 6, that shows a state’s relative degree of involvement 
in adopting climate change policies. The second is a percentage showing the recent trend in 
emissions change for the electric power sector. The final step to derive the case study states is 
simply to calculate a ratio of policy score to emissions change, ultimately selecting the most 
expected and unexpected results from both ends of the policy score spectrum. New York is one 
of the case studies derived from the high end of the policy spectrum. New York scored a highest-
possible 6 in its policy ranking, and also had the lowest percent emissions change, -31.1%, for 
the period 2005-2010 of any other state in its category. The negative ratio (6:-31.1, or 1:-5.2) is 
the lowest in category 6, and therefore serves as an example of what we would expect to find as a 
result of this analysis. Conversely, Oregon also scored a 6 in its policy ranking, but it had the 
highest percent emissions change, 19.8%, in that category. Its positive ratio (6:19.8, or 1:3.3) is 




in policies that should have lowered that figure. Iowa is also a surprising case because it scored a 
5 in its policy ranking, but had one of the highest percentage increases in emissions—13.9% for 
the 2005-2010 period—of any state in that category. The resulting positive ratio (5:13.9, or 
1:2.78) is second only to the state of Rhode Island in category 5. Rhode Island, however, is an 
outlier and not a good case study state due to its very small population and relatively small (0.69 
MMTCO2) amount of increase in its carbon emissions compared to other states in its category. 
Due to the relationship between their particular location on the policy spectrum and their 
emissions change, each of these three states—New York, Oregon, and Iowa—tells a distinct 
story about the varying outcomes of climate change policies. An analysis of the data shows that 
some policies work better than others depending on the how and where they are implemented.  
But local economic or environmental conditions sometimes have an impact on how well a policy 
works, and can produce unexpected consequences. In terms of emissions reduction, the primary 
goal for climate change mitigation, sometimes those consequences can be positive, and other 











Table 3: High Policy States 








California 6 1.42 3.4% 
Connecticut 6 -2.15 -22.0% 
Massachusetts 6 -6.10 -25.3% 
Minnesota 6 -6.16 -17.5% 
New Jersey 6 -1.45 -7.6% 
New Mexico 6 -2.99 -9.4% 
New York 6 -17.01 -31.1% 
Oregon 6 1.59 19.8% 
Washington 6 -0.96 -6.9% 
Illinois 5 0.68 0.7% 
Iowa 5 4.90 13.9% 
Maine 5 -1.22 -32.2% 
Michigan 5 -5.19 -7.0% 
New Hampshire 5 -2.32 -30.3% 
Rhode Island 5 0.69 28.9% 
Vermont 5 0.00 0.0% 
Wisconsin 5 -5.99 -12.5% 
Table 3 above shows all states that scored a 5 or 6 on the combined policy scale alongside each 
state’s emissions change from the electric power sector during the 2005-2010 period, shown in 
millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide (MMTCO2) and percentage change. Of the highest 




is therefore the case study with the most expected results in terms of the relationship between 
policy involvement and overall emissions reduction. Oregon increased its emissions the second 
most as a percentage (19.8%) behind Rhode Island (28.9%), but the small size of Rhode Island, 
the fact that its emissions change was less than one million metric tons of carbon dioxide, and 
Oregon’s intense use of biofuels in a failed attempt to reduce emissions make Oregon the second 
case study. Finally, Iowa had the highest emissions increase as a percentage (13.9%) after 
Oregon, making it the third case study. 
 On the lower end of the policy spectrum, another set of states with expected and 
unexpected emissions outcomes completes the range of case studies.  Mississippi, one of the 
states that ranks 0 on the policy scale, has an unsurprising increase in emissions for the 2005-
2010 period. Mississippi’s heavy reliance on coal for electric power and its lack of any 
significant regulation to limit emissions is representative of many Southern and Midwestern 
states that rank in categories 0 and 1 on the policy scale. Not only have Mississippi’s U.S. 
Senators voted against comprehensive climate change policies on Congress, state laws do not 
require even a basic inventory of emissions source (CCS Mississippi). Evolving EPA regulations 
are currently changing this dynamic, but new national standards being devised right now are 
outside the scope of this project’s timeframe. The resulting ratio for Mississippi (0:6.2) is one of 
the highest in category 0 and can therefore serve as a benchmark for “do-nothing” climate 
change policy (the ratio for Idaho, at 0:8.1, is slightly higher, but its absolute figure for change in 
carbon emissions, 0.05 MMTCO2, is negligible compared to almost all other states).   
 There are, however, outliers among the low-ranking policy states that have reduced their 
emissions levels despite their lack of carbon pollution mitigation. The state of Tennessee, with an 




that have shunned the kinds of greenhouse gas action plans that other, more liberal states have 
successfully adopted. This major emissions reduction is due in large part to the growth in low-
carbon energy provided by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a utility unique in its history 
and geography in the United States. In terms of analyzing the unexpected ratios of policy 
involvement and emissions reduction, however, Tennessee’s disproportionate reliance on the 
TVA for nuclear and hydroelectric power generation prevent it from being a representative 
example of a state that lowered its carbon emissions despite a lack of climate policy engagement.  
Therefore the state of North Dakota, whose 6.5 percent drop in emissions make it the state with 
the third lowest ratio (0:-6.5) of all the states in its group, will serve as the fifth case study.  
North Dakota has been at the center of the recent proliferation of cheap natural gas produced by 
hydrofracking, a fossil fuel that emits less carbon pollution than coal and oil.  However, this 
modern day gold rush for natural gas has created many new challenges for cutting emissions—
for example, by outcompeting non-subsidized renewable energy in the short term—and local 
environmental threats to water resources and human health, that it can be viewed as a microcosm 
for some of the larger energy policy transformations taking place in the U.S. Finally, the state of 
Georgia, with a ratio of 0:-6.9, rounds out the list of case studies because it ranks second behind 
Tennessee in the category of low ranking policy states that nonetheless have shown significant 
drops in emissions. Georgia, which is similar to Tennessee and all other states in categories 0 and 
1 in that it lacks carbon mitigation policies, has its own set of unique factors that have 
contributed to its emissions cuts, namely its recent shutdown of a few large, coal-fired power 
plants and its unexpected focus on threats to its water supply and other conservation issues 





Table 4: Low Policy States 








Indiana 1 -7.71 -6.5% 
Kentucky 1 1.72 1.9% 
Missouri 1 -2.03 -2.6% 
Nebraska 1 1.75 8.3% 
Oklahoma 1 -1.89 -3.9% 
South Carolina 1 0.93 2.4% 
South Dakota 1 0.24 7.4% 
Texas 1 -8.49 -3.7% 
Alabama 0 -4.29 -5.4% 
Georgia 0 -5.72 -6.9% 
Idaho 0 0.05 8.1% 
Louisiana 0 -0.31 -0.7% 
Mississippi 0 1.51 6.2% 
North Dakota 0 -2.14 -6.5% 
Tennessee 0 -11.19 -21.0% 
Wyoming 0 -0.50 -1.2% 
Table 4 above shows all states that scored a 0 or 1 on the combined policy scale alongside each 
state’s emissions change from the electric power sector during the 2005-2010 period, shown in 
millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide (MMTCO2) and percentage change. Of the lowest 
scoring states (group 0), Mississippi increased its emissions the second most as a percentage 




(0.05 MMTCO2) makes it a relatively poor comparative case study. Therefore, Mississippi, the 
poster child for climate policy inaction, is the first case study among states with low policy 
involvement scores. Tennessee reduced its emissions the most as a percentage (21%), but due to 
the unique role of the Tennessee Valley Authority in shaping that state’s energy policy 
(discussed further in “Methodology and Findings”), it is not a state with policy outcomes that can 
be easily replicated in others states or the U.S. as a whole. It is therefore not a useful case study. 
After Tennessee, Georgia lowered its emissions the most as a percentage (6.9%), and is therefore 
the second case study among states with low or no policy involvement. Finally, North Dakota 
lowered its emissions as a percentage (6.5%) the most after Georgia, making it the third case 
study. 
 
Map Comparison 1: Wheeler (2010) and Lutsey et al. (2008) 
The two maps showing the state distribution of carbon emissions policy measurements based on 
Wheeler (2010) and Lutsey et al (2008) show a consistent geographic pattern that validates the 
methodology of combining the two rankings systems into one overall ranking system. In general, 
we see that states in the Northeast, Upper Midwest and West Coast (green shades on both maps) 
have high climate policy involvement scores on both scales. These are the states that have 
enacted the most emissions cutting regulations—especially states such as New York, 
Massachusetts, Illinois and California—and both of the two basic ranking scales reflect this high 
level of policy participation. We also see that most of the states in the South, Lower Midwest and 
Upper Rockies regions (red shades on both maps) have low climate policy involvement scores on 




regulations—especially states such as Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and North Dakota—and 
each 3-point ranking system reflects this low level of policy participation.  









Map 2: Wheeler (2010) State Rankings 
 
 
Map Comparison 2: Emissions Change expressed as MMTCO2 and as Percentage  
The two maps below show the range of emissions change in the electric power sector from 2005-
2010 in all the Lower 48 states. It is important to note that while there is a wide range of 
variability in terms of individual states’ overall emissions change that is mainly due to their 
States’ Positions on Carbon Emissions Regulation  





policy ranking, the general trend for the United States during this period has been a lowering of 
total carbon emissions. This means that many of the states that rank low on the policy scale still 
decreased their emissions, but their emissions reductions were far less than those of states that 
ranked higher on the policy scale. The maps showing total emissions change as an absolute value 
(MMTCO2, millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide) and as a percentage clearly show how two 
states at the opposite ends of the policy spectrum—New York and Mississippi—are also on the 
opposite ends of the emissions change scale. New York is dark red and Mississippi is dark green. 
However, other states that rank low on the policy involvement scale—such as Louisiana, North 
Dakota and Kentucky—are all shaded light green and had modest emission reductions compared 
to states with higher policy rankings. The complete landscape shown in both maps demonstrates 
the relative range of state emission reductions based on policy involvement, but with an 
important caveat. That is, most states—even many of states with low policy participation 
scores—cut their emissions over this time period. But the states with more emissions cutting 
































Factors for Lower Emissions  
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative  
 New York is a prime example of a state with successful climate change policy.  It is a 
founding member of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cap-and-trade exchange 
system set up by states in the Northeast and New England to put a price on carbon emissions 
mainly from coal fired power plants. According to its website, RGGI is “the first market-based 
regulatory program in the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and it “is a 
cooperative effort among the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from 
the power sector.”  RGGI acts as a clearinghouse for auctioned carbon credits and requires fossil 
fuel power plants located in participating states that generate over 25 megawatts to obtain an 
allowance for each ton of carbon dioxide or carbon dioxide equivalent emitted annually (NYS-
DEC). The system provides some flexibility by allowing power plants within the region to 
comply with the cap by purchasing allowances from quarterly auctions, other generators within 
the region, or offset projects. This program has been effective in reducing emissions for all 
participating states through the establishment of markets for trading carbon credits. It has also 
been able to lower the cap substantially due to the unexpectedly large amount of emissions 
reductions it achieved early on in its development. 
According to Steve Liss, counsel to Assemblyman Robert Sweeney, Democrat and Chair 
of the Environmental Conservation Committee, New York further distinguishes itself from other, 
less environmentally conscious states by being “willing to consider climate change as a policy 




nature of climate change policy often prevents it from being considered in more conservative 
state legislatures. This is a symptom of the larger issue, one that this project seeks to address, that 
the absence of a national standard for climate change mitigation has created a policy vacuum in 
which states are left to devise their own strategy. Changing political whims from state to state 
therefore create a very uneven policy landscape. Liss goes on to say that even though “climate 
change bills are constantly being rejected by the Republican Senate” (Ibid), there is a healthy 
debate in state government over how best to reduce carbon pollution.  This push back from the 
state Senate can delay or derail potential mitigation policies, but strong support in the Assembly 
and, to varying degrees, from Governors Patterson and Cuomo, has produced policies that 
contribute to the lower emissions figures shown in EPA data. 
 
Economic Downturn 
While regional programs among states like RGGI and smaller scale efficiency programs 
have played substantial roles in lowering New York’s carbon emissions over the last few years, it 
is also critical to note that economic downturn—with uneven impacts upstate versus down, and 
across the nation as a whole—has also been a major factor, if an unwelcome and temporary one. 
Upstate New York’s economy had been sputtering long before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 
brought on a national recession, and New York was among a group of states that were already 
closing old and inefficient coal-fired power plants both in response to lower natural gas prices 
and in anticipation of new EPA regulations. Nonetheless, the economic slowdown brought 
additional emissions cuts that, while not an optimal factor for making New York a leader in 
carbon pollution reduction, have allowed the state to transition more quickly from older, dirtier 




Connor Bambrick, Air and energy Program Director for Environmental Advocates of 
New York, also points to the economic downturn as a reason for New York’s emissions cuts, but 
says the reasons go far beyond that and are on the whole positive and sustainable for the future.  
Indeed, according to his assessment, there is so much more potential for emissions reductions 
through efficiency and other state-wide policies—along with a shift back to economic growth—
that New York State could and should be a model for other states and eventually a national 
standard. He argues that, while RGGI is now a well-working program that has allowed for a 
large proportion of emissions cuts, it had a very rocky start. Part of the difficulty in 
implementing RGGI in the beginning had to do with setting the correct “floor” price for 
emissions trading. Emissions were already relatively low for New York State, making the 
demand for emissions credits low also, which led to the market “bottoming out” in the beginning.  
Bambrick continues: 
“RGGI in theory caps emissions and allows generators to buy down allowances.  
But the initial auctions significantly overestimated what the cap should be.  So 
emissions levels consistently came in below the cap, and allowances would 
therefore be sold at the “floor” price.  RGGI has bottomed out.  There is a new 
model rule proposed, 9 RGGI states are now legislating to allow new rule.  The 
new rule lowers the cap to reflect the actual lower level of emissions.  The process 
shows that the concept behind RGGI is right, and only that the initial cap was not 
set at the correct level.  Auction revenue did however go to building retrofits and 
energy efficiency projects, as was the original intention.” 
This lowering of the emissions cap for RGGI was the kind of adjustment that cap-and-trade 
regimes are built to accommodate, but it takes time in real world applications to gauge where to 
set the appropriate level. Ultimately the goal of any cap-and-trade system is to channel auction 
revenue to facilities that can keep cutting emissions through retrofits and carbon scrubbing 




While highlighting the impact that RGGI has had on reducing emissions in New York, 
Bambrick pointed to the recent economic downturn as another factor, echoing the words of Steve 
Liss, counsel to Assemblyman Robert Sweeney, Democrat and Chair of the Environmental 
Conservation Committee. The traditional definition of economic growth is deeply intertwined 
with energy consumption and carbon emissions, so the relationship between economic slowdown 
and lower carbon dioxide output is a constant factor when analyzing trends in emissions levels 
(Stern 2011). However, rather than seeing this correlation as absolute, it is important to note that 
as the energy profiles of states become more diverse, actual emissions levels will begin to 
diverge from economic growth rates (Plumer 2014). That is, as renewables contribute more to 
overall output and carbon-intensive sources are reigned in, economies will be able to keep 
growing without necessarily increasing emissions.  Even after New York’s economy began to 
rebound by 2012, its carbon emissions continued to decline (Environment America 2012). So the 
burning of fossil fuels and economic growth will no longer be inextricably tied at the hip.  This is 
happening also with the voluntary closing of some coal-fired power plants.  As Bambrick 
continues: 
 
  “Why have rates gone down? Economic downturn has played a significant role.  
Flip flopping of coal vs gas prior to EPA rule and major drop in gas prices.  NY was already 
closing coal and oil electric production.  There are two main energy markets, 1) day ahead utility 
market, and 2) spot market that sells every 5 mins.  This is the wholesale market, generators 
participate in a third “just in case” capacity market, divided in 2 sections NYC and LI, and then 
rest of state capacity.  At peak hours there is a transmission problem in western and southern tier.” 
 
Transportation and leakage—the so-called “whack-a-mole” problem—are also big challenges for 
the success of this kind of program. This issue ultimately points to the need for larger scale, 




area are not immediately lost somewhere else. RGGI is a microcosm both for the potential 
advantages and drawbacks of a national cap-and-trade program. Ultimately the benefits of 
significantly cutting emissions will outweigh the difficulties in implementation and compliance.   
 
Factors for Policy Implementation 
Social Cost of Carbon 
 One of the ways the EPA and other government agencies measure the benefits of cutting 
carbon emissions is by calculating the “social cost of carbon.”  The EPA uses the social cost of 
carbon to “estimate the climate benefits of rulemakings” (EPA 11/2013). It does this by 
estimating the “economic damages associated with a small increase in carbon dioxide emissions, 
conventionally one metric ton, in a given year.” On the other side of the equation to calculate the 
costs of emissions, the social cost of carbon also “represents the value of damages avoided for a 
small emissions reduction.” So the significance of a figure like the social cost of carbon is its use 
in showing the real monetary impacts that increasing carbon emissions are having on many 
different sectors of the economy and society, and conversely in showing the benefits of avoiding 
further negative effects of high emissions levels. The U.S. government uses $37 as its estimate of 
how much a ton of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere costs, including decreased 
agricultural productivity, damage from rising sea levels and harm to human health related to 
climate change. But a report by the group Cost of Carbon released	   in	   2014 argues that that 
estimate is too low and doesn’t include costs of other major climate impacts, like increased 
respiratory illness from higher pollen or ozone, or the spread of insect-borne diseases such as 
Lyme disease, or the toll that ocean acidification will take on fisheries. The report, a joint project 




$37 figure should represent the lower bound of the social cost of carbon because the calculation 
omits many climate impacts and effectively values them at zero. The current value of the social 
cost of carbon, therefore, is lower than it should be and incomplete as it tends only to include a 
portion of the potential harms from climate change.   
 The social cost of carbon is very closely related to state and regional carbon capping 
programs like RGGI because these programs partially base the value of their carbon credits on 
the social cost. Ultimately, in a well-functioning cap and trade system like RGGI, or an 
international regime, the social cost of carbon is paid by those who create the emissions, while 
revenue from those sales creates direct economic and environmental benefits for the people who 
bear the burden of that carbon pollution (Ernst 2013). This kind of revenue transfer is one of the 
main mechanisms that can address the dual problem of unequal causes and unequal impacts of 
climate change. This is a set of problems that happens at every scale, from local to global.  For 
example, in terms of unequal causes, any given state will have a variety of electricity producers, 
some which emit more greenhouse gases than others. By the same token, the effects of global 
warming will harm different populations within that state differently, thus showing the unequal 
impacts. It is often the case that those that are harmed most might not necessarily be the ones 
buying their electricity from the dirty, coal-fired power plant. Therefore, a system that compels 
industry to put a price on energy that reflects its true cost to society while at the same time 
helping those hurt most by carbon pollution creates incentives that are aligned for both polluters 
and society at large. This is a local example, but the same is true for entire countries and the 
international system writ large: many of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, such as low-lying island nations and tropical countries exposed to more severe extreme 
weather events, are not those that bear the greatest responsibility for industrial emissions, like the 




programs—that success depends on accurately monetizing the relationship between impacts of 
and responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions—applies internationally. 
 
State-to-State Emissions Leakage 
 One of the major drawbacks of non-comprehensive, small-scale systems is that there are 
always going to be ways to take advantage of the unregulated world beyond the reach of the 
system itself by transferring emissions, costs, or both. The term for transferring emissions to 
other states is often referred to as “leakage,” and is defined by the “concept that there could be a 
shift of electricity generation from capped sources subject to RGGI to higher-emitting sources 
not subject to RGGI” (RGGI Leakage 2008). The idea of leakage recognizes the well-established 
economic rule that energy producers have an incentive to change location if costs are lower 
beyond the regulated system (IPCC AR4 2007).  This means that competition from utilities that 
are not subject to tighter controls on emissions limits the effectiveness of regional programs; as 
long as there is a neighbor selling cheaper, yet dirtier, power, there will be a market to buy it 
regardless of the costs of impacts to the wider society. This problem of mitigating “externalized” 
costs will always exist in a system that prices carbon emissions differently in different places.  
Competition is a good thing, but only on a level playing field.  RGGI’s own assessment for the 
leakage problem is clear:  
Because RGGI is being implemented in a competitive generation market, the 
addition of a carbon compliance cost that applies to only a subset of electric 
generators in the market could lead to a shift in the dispatch of electric generators 
and changes in flows of energy on the transmission system in response to this 
carbon price signal. The concept of emissions leakage is, therefore, specific to a 




being implemented does not fully cover the respective regional wholesale 
electricity market(s). (RGGI Evaluating Market Dynamics 2007) 
RGGI concludes that a national program is the only way to solve this puzzle, and Connor 
Bambrick of Environmental Advocates of New York agrees, adding a comment on the new 
actions by the EPA: 
“Biggest nut to crack is transportation sector...  They need to address “leakage” 
issue as a critical next step emissions governed outside RGGI area that are caused 
by.  For NY State biggest leakage is PJM (PA, NJ, DC, and other states) that’s the 
big problem, how to account for the difference between states?  How do you 
accurately count with such disparities across state lines?  This underlies a strong 
argument for national standard.  EPA rule moves in that direction.”   
There will always be a way around state or regional emissions regulations in the absence of a 
national climate policy. The EPA officially proposed a national rule for new fossil fuel electricity 
generating units in 2014, which is a step in the right direction in terms of a national climate 
policy. However, the rules for state-by-state flexibility and implementation are still in their 
infancy and will not be in effect for at least a few more years. And there are sure to be more legal 
challenges to the EPA’s authority to regulate states’ emissions in this manner, even despite the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision to allow the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide as a “harmful 
pollutant” under the Clean Air Act (Greenhouse 2007). 
 
Oregon 
 Like New York State, it is not surprising that Oregon ranks high on the policy scale. It is 
a politically liberal state whose members of Congress have repeatedly voted for legislation meant 
to mitigate climate change with environmental policies geared toward accounting for and 




in that its emissions levels rose from 2005 to 2010, the same period in which, based on its state 
energy policies, one would have expected them to drop. But certain factors in Oregon’s energy 
and population profiles have caused its emissions to increase. These factors can reveal the 
limitations of some types of climate change policies when they are grafted onto states with 
particular circumstances that make cutting emissions especially difficult.    
 
Factors for Higher Emissions  
Biofuels  
 The first major factor that has added to Oregon’s growth in emissions is its focus on 
biofuels to produce electricity. Oregon and many other ostensibly “green” states have attempted 
to reduce their reliance on non-renewable energy by growing their use of renewable energy, 
chief among them are biofuels. Biofuels constitute a wide range of plant matter, vegetable oils, 
ethanol distilled from corn, and other substances that can be combusted in the same way as fossil 
fuels. The theoretical advantage of biofuels for reducing emissions is that they are “carbon 
neutral” since they only emit carbon that they recently drew from the atmosphere during their 
natural growth cycle. This basic rebalancing of the carbon equation has been an attractive option 
for states and utilities that are interested in cutting their emissions while transitioning to 
renewable energy sources. The reality of biofuels and their net emissions, however, is far more 
complex and often does not have a carbon neutral result. 
 There are external factors that add to the carbon signature of biofuels. There is a 
significant carbon footprint for the water and fertilizer used to grow the crops or plant material.  




power generation facilities. According to Adam Crawford, the Health, Energy and 
Environmental Committee Administrator for the Oregon State Legislature, biofuels are good for 
producing power but “transportation of biofuels could tip the scale to make it carbon positive” 
(quoted 4/2/13). While this increase in emissions is often the reality of seemingly carbon neutral 
biofuel production, local politics come into play and mix the goals of wanting to lower emissions 
while also wanting to boost local fuel production. Mr. Crawford goes on to say that “renewable 
energy possibilities are a good thing for democrats, especially using local resources to generate 
power” (Ibid). The question of biofuels can therefore become a problem when politicians and 
even their well-intentioned constituencies want contradictory things: an increase in biofuel 
production and use AND a drop in emissions. In fact, states might not be able to have it both 
ways. 
Moreover, according to the office of Representative Jules Bailey, the Democratic Chair 
of the Health, Energy and Environmental Committee, the “production of biofuel from forests 
will increase greenhouse emissions.” Rep. Bailey’s legislative aid pointed to a recent study out of 
Oregon State University, published in the journal Nature Climate Change, which was to date the 
“largest and most comprehensive study” showing that a focus on biofuel derived from forests 
would increase the potential for carbon dioxide emissions by up to 14 percent (OSU 2011).  
Although these findings seems contrary to the general assumptions about biofuels, they take into 
account the net loss of carbon capture potential of forests when those forested lands are instead 
used for the production of biomass that is converted to fuel for energy production. Tara Hudiburg, 
a lead author on the study, explains the discrepancy:  
“On the west coast, we found that projected forest biomass removal and use for 
bioenergy in any form will release more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than current 




neutral, because the forest regrows and there is also the chance of protecting forests from 
carbon emissions due to wildfire.  However, our research showed that emissions from 
these activities proved to be more than the savings. 
While it is important to note that there is a wide range of feedstocks that can produce biofuels—
from corn to sugarcane to switchgrass—production in the Pacific Northwest has centered on 
forests. For every type of biofuel, there will always be some sort of tradeoff in terms of forgoing 
some alternate use of arable land for the production of energy. When food crops like corn and 
sugarcane are processed into ethanol, the markets for these commodities are affected and there 
could be wider repercussions for farmers and consumers. Focusing on non-food crops for biofuel 
can address this problem, but it does not necessarily solve the larger problem of net increases in 
carbon emissions. Another author of the Oregon State study, Barbara Law, professor of Forest 
Ecosystems and Society, simply states “if our ultimate goal is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, producing bioenergy from forests will be counterproductive. Some of these forest 
management practices may also have negative impacts on soils, biodiversity and habitat. These 
issues have not been thought out very fully” (Ibid, emphasis added). Forests act as a carbon sink, 
and when they are repurposed for biofuel production, they lose this capacity and end up adding 
net carbon to the atmosphere.   
Environmental and community-based challenges also stem out of where to locate and 
grow enough biomass to fuel a large power plant. Adam Crawford, the health, energy and 
environmental committee administrator for the state, identified one major problem with a 
specific kind of biomass in use in Oregon and elsewhere: 
There is a pilot program in place to convert Boardman coal plant into a biomass 




Downside, grows like a weed, sucks up a lot of water, which is scarce and very 
controversial resource in eastern Oregon. 
This so-called giant reed, Arundo donax, is in fact an invasive species whose use as a biofuel 
feedstock is widely debated and whose consequences in terms of water use and environmental 
damage are not yet fully understood (Mack 2008). One of the worries is that the reed itself 
spreads far beyond planted fields and can have adverse effects, like those of invasive weed 
species in agricultural and forest lands, and has been known to outcompete native species for 
space and water resources in the West and Southwest. 
 
Population Growth 
 Two other key elements—one intuitive and the other seemingly counterintuitive—added 
to Oregon’s net increase in carbon emissions. In another part of the interview with Crawford, he 
noted that the recent above-average population growth in large cities like Portland and Salem has 
accounted for part of the increased energy use. Young people and retirees have been flocking to 
these areas of Oregon (KGW Portland 2014) mainly for quality of life and relatively low living 
costs (Christie 2014).  Crawford noted that: 
Population growth also accounts for emissions increase.  People love Portland.  
Unemployment rate is a little above national average.  But there are two main 
cohorts moving to the state despite poor job market: retirees coming from 
Washington DC and elsewhere who are taking advantage of tax incentives, and 
young people coming because they love it and don’t care as much about finding a 
job. 
 Another less intuitive reason for this increase in emissions is the recent economic 




normally mean a drop in emissions due to decreased energy consumption and a general drop in 
economic activity. There has been such an outcome on national figures since the Great Recession 
began in earnest in 2008 following the bursting of the housing bubble (Romm 2010). However, 
in response to the national economic downturn, some states that were members of regional 
greenhouse gas reduction partnerships opted out of these voluntary programs with the hope of 
turning around their state economies. This was the case for Oregon, as Mr. Crawford noted in the 
interview. Until the economic recession occurred, Oregon was a member of the Western Climate 
Initiative, something of a sister program to the East Coast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 
a cap-and-trade regime for reducing emissions of power plants in participating states. These sorts 
of regional emissions trading plans incurred marginal costs to power producers, but were 
successful in lowering emissions and allowing for more competition in the market for renewable 
energy producers.   
The problem, however, is that some states that are experiencing an economic slowdown 
attribute part of the situation to higher energy costs and in turn seek to back away from regional 
GHG trading programs. It can be difficult for states like Oregon to maintain their participation in 
regional programs during times of economic recession and recovery, and when the relative cost 
of cutting emissions is higher than it is for neighboring states like California. One of the main 
functions of this type of regional programs is to pool the overall responsibility for lowering 
emissions to allow for more flexibility for states with higher costs. That is, states can elect to 
emit more carbon dioxide from their power plants and other sources in exchange for buying 
emissions credits from other states that have already invested in lower emissions technology.  
However, this formula starts to break down in terms of energy costs when we factor in states that 




damage the economic incentive for program-participating states to lower their emissions because 
they do not incur an immediate cost for their higher carbon dioxide levels.   
Those “externalized” costs are instead spread out widely and unevenly across the country 
and the globe in the form of impacts on human health, higher costs from extreme weather events 
and coastal flooding from sea level rise. The fact that regional and even national programs 
inevitably encounter the problems of cost competition with neighboring regions and countries 
that do not limit their emissions is a strong argument for enlarging these programs to cover the 
largest economic and geographic extent possible. The purpose of carbon pricing regimes is to let 
the price of energy—whether based on fossil fuels, renewable sources, nuclear, etc.—reflect its 
true costs to society and the environment. Part of the lesson of Oregon shows that fickle state and 
regional GHG reduction programs can be fickle, and demonstrates the need for national level 
policies to create uniform incentives for all states and to fill in the gaps of the patchwork of 
existing state and local policies.   
 
Factors for Lack of Policy Implementation 
Exit from Regional Emissions Agreement 
 The increased use of biofuels and an economic recession were the main factors in raising 
the state’s emissions, forcing it to leave the Western Climate Initiative (WCI 2014). Moreover, it 
is not just the production but the added cost of transportation of biofuels that adds to its 
emissions profile: 
Transportation of biofuels could tip the scale to make it carbon positive.  




local resources to generate power.  [But there are] 2 strong programs: renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS), series of steps to get base-load power by renewable 
energy.  2009-2011 43% hydro, 34% coal, 12% gas, etc. public data.  A big coal 
plant (Boardman plant) in east of the state is closing because of new OR state law 
stemming from negative externalities, health, pollution.  [There is a] request for 
proposals to make the old coal plant into a gas-fired plant. (Crawford interview) 
The proposal to convert the Boardman plant from coal to gas stems out of the realization in 
Oregon and elsewhere that new EPA rules on fossil fuel-fired power plants will eventually 
require coal to be phased out in favor of less carbon-intensive gas. Oregon is therefore poised to 
be able to cut its emissions by switching away from coal, but the proposal of the new EPA rules 
is only a first step toward this end. Oregon’s emissions rose during the five year period ending in 
2010, and two of the important reasons for this change had little to do with the state’s energy 
policy and much more to do with demographic changes.   
 
State-to-State Emissions Leakage 
 Much of this boils down to the issue of leakage, discussed in detail above.  Pacific Power, 
a major utility on the West Coast, continues to operate outdated coal plants, many of them 
located in states like Wyoming and Utah that do not participate in state or regional emissions 
cutting programs (Randall 2014). Thus the problem of leakage remains at the forefront of climate 
policy debate because relatively cheap, yet extremely carbon-intensive coal-generated electricity 
is readily available even in markets that make other attempts to cut emissions. Moreover, if 
leakage means that any attempt by one state, region or country to lower emissions can be erased 
by subsequent higher emissions somewhere else, then the fundamental problem is that of the 
“tragedy of the commons.” From an economic perspective the cost-benefit analysis is clear: 




unaffected by the location of emissions (Stavins 2010). This means that any local or national 
government taking action will incur the direct costs of its actions, but the direct benefits (averted 
climate change) will be distributed globally. So the direct climate benefits a state or region reaps 
from its actions will inevitably be less than the costs it incurs, despite the fact that global climate 
benefits are likely to be greater than global costs. 
 
Iowa 
Factors for Higher Emissions 
Reliance on Coal 
 Iowa is another example of a state that ranks high on the policy scale but surprisingly still 
has increased its carbon emissions. In this way Iowa is unique among the other states in the fifth 
policy involvement category: all other states that scored a “5” in the policy category had 
reductions in their emissions over the 2005 to 2010 period. There is a particular set of 
circumstances that account for this difference, but the main reason for Iowa’s maintaining its 
high emissions level is straightforward: it continues to rely heavily on coal for energy production 
(EIA Iowa 2015).  This holds true despite Iowa’s relatively liberal climate change policies and its 
membership in the Midwest greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. In fact, these two factors 
ironically might contribute to the state’s emissions increases by masking its heavy reliance on 
coal and showing that basic policies that acknowledge climate change are not always enough to 
effectively cut emissions. At first blush, this can seem counterintuitive, but ultimately the 
explanation for Iowa’s emissions supports the argument that a national emissions policy would 




 There is ample evidence to show that Iowa’s reliance on coal is the largest contributing 
factor to its high emissions levels. Watchdog groups such as Environment Iowa have shown that 
in spite of a general statewide urge for more renewable energy, Iowa is still home to “some of 
the nation’s oldest and most polluting coal-fired power plants” (Environment Iowa 2009).  
According to a 2009 expert assessment of existing and planned power plants in Iowa, “the 
building of new coal plants in Marshalltown and Waterloo would have been disastrous, now we 
need to make sure that we clean up these plants that we’ve already built” (Ibid). Many coal 
plants that are still in use are decades old and extremely inefficient, and these older facilities are 
often subject to more lax emissions regulations than newer, cleaner plants. Real emissions 
reductions would require fixing this regulation disparity between old and new plants. The 2009 
assessment found that these old coal plants are simply “outdated and under-regulated. Old coal-
fired clunkers ought to have to meet modern emissions standards” (Ibid). While Iowa is certainly 
not unique in the U.S. in terms of its heavy use of coal, it does have a relatively high proportion 
of old coal plants that by definition emit more pollution per unit of energy produced (PSR 2010).  
This fact alone makes it very difficult in terms of time and expense to update or close old 
facilities and replace them with more efficient, combined-cycle plants.   
 But given the impacts climate change and localized pollution are having on Iowa and 
elsewhere, states need to make the difficult calculation between current inefficiency and 
environmental damage from pollution versus higher upfront costs that eventually pay for 
themselves in the long run through lower waste and emissions levels. This process of accounting 
for “externalized” costs is the essence of any regional, national or international program to cut 
carbon emissions, but it can be hard to see the external costs of climate change on smaller scales 
like at the state level. That is why a state like Iowa that has a high policy participation rate yet 




national emissions trading program. It could translate its substantial experience in climate policy 
into willingness to invest in retrofitting coal-fired power plants to capture and sequester carbon 
dioxide and buy carbon credits on the market to make up for its residual coal dependence.  
Neighboring states with even lower emissions levels could also benefit from Iowa’s retrofitting 
investment by being able to buy cleaner energy and then sell their carbon credits with the hope 




In addition to coal, Iowa’s agricultural sector is another major contributor to state-wide 
emissions.  In an interview with State Representative Lee Hein, (R) Chair of the Environmental 
Protection Committee, these along with a handful of other sectors like transportation and 
industry explain the contradiction of why Iowa’s emissions have risen while it has also remained 
involved in a relatively high level of emission-cutting policies. Iowa is an energy producer with 
some of the nation’s highest levels of ethanol production and a relatively energy-intense 
economy. While it does not produce any of its own coal or natural gas, Iowa’s five largest power 
plants are all coal-fired, the primary fuel used in electricity generation in the state (EIA, cited 
above).  Coal-fired plants also produce about two-thirds of the electricity generated in the state, 
while the second largest source of electricity generation is wind-powered turbines, which 
account for about one-fourth of Iowa's net generation. The state's one nuclear plant, Duane 
Arnold, is located just northwest of Cedar Rapids and generates less than one-tenth of the state's 
electricity. So it is fair to say that Iowa is very reliant on coal for electricity, but it is politically 




emissions policies in place and has a large number of its Congressional delegation that have 
voted for national climate legislation in the past.  
 Emissions have grown each year for the period of 2005-2010 with the largest shares 
coming from electric power generation and agriculture. One study from Environment Iowa 
showed that Iowa-based emissions grew at a faster rate than the national average from 1990-
2007, and that much of this higher rate of growth was due to the increased use of coal-fired 
power plants. During this 17-year period, represented by some of the most recent and complete 
data from the EPA, Iowa’s emissions climbed by over 35%. Over that same period, nationwide 
emissions grew by 19% (Environment Iowa 2009). Overall, Iowa had the sixth-highest carbon 
dioxide emissions increase of any state from 2005-2007 (ibid). Indeed, in 2007, prior to the 
current boom in cheap natural gas from hydrofracking, “The coal rush in America's heartland 
[was] on a collision course with Congress” (Mufson 2007). An electric utility executive, David 
Sokol of MidAmerican Energy Holdings, noted at the time that “A lot of congressmen ask me, 
'Dave, why are you building that coal plant? And I say, 'What are my options?'” given that coal-
fired plants provide half the electricity supply in the country (Ibid). Despite the fact that the 
continued heavy use of coal was on a “collision course” with Congress during this period, coal-
fired power generation was still seen as the most economical and perhaps only sensible way to 
deliver cheap electricity. In 2014, by contrast, many of these coal plants—now owned by 
Berkshire Hathaway, the holding corporation of billionaire Warren Buffett—have been slated for 







Factors for Lack of Policy Implementation 
 
Liberal Congressional Delegation 
 Coal is a prominent fuel source in Iowa, and emissions-intensive agriculture is also an 
important element in the state’s greenhouse gas levels. So we must contrast these factors with the 
state’s relatively liberal national politicians and high level of participation in various climate 
action plans. As a first example, Iowa’s junior senator, Tom Harkin, a Democrat in office since 
1985, is ranked the 15th most liberal in the Senate by the National Journal which is based on a 
senator’s voting record and bills introduced (McGill 2013). While the same cannot be said for 
Iowa’s senior senator, Chuck Grassley (KOS 2009), a Republican in office since 1981, the state 
of Iowa still has a robust climate action plan with 56 different policy options to achieve 
emissions reductions including energy efficiency and incentives for utilities (C2ES 2009).  
Perhaps most significant for the methodology and analysis of this project, a majority of Iowa’s 5 
members of the US House of Representatives voted in favor (3 Democratic votes, 2 Republican 
votes) of the 2009 Waxman-Markey bill to set up a cap-and-trade system (NYT Politics 2009).   
 
Carbon Intensive State 
This shows that Iowa is something of an anomaly in that its emissions levels generated by 
the state’s utilities and agriculture sectors are relatively high, however in 2009 when the most 
ambitious climate change bill came before Congress, Iowa had a slim majority of 
Representatives willing to vote for it. This might have been an early example of politicians 
getting “out ahead” of their constituents in the context of climate change policy.  But the political 




made it almost impossible for a Republican to vote for another cap-and-trade bill if one came to 
the floor, let alone a bill that would effectively put a price on industrial carbon emissions 
(Desilver 2013).   
 
Mississippi 
Factors for Higher Emissions 
Reliance on Coal, Poverty and Lack of Clean Energy 
 The state of Mississippi is also heavily reliant on coal, but in contrast to Iowa, it does not 
have policies to curb emissions and has a staunchly Republican Congressional delegation that 
has consistently voted against national climate change legislation. Mississippi has the lowest 
possible ranking of “0” on the policy involvement scale and has the second highest percentage of 
emissions increase (6.2%) among the seven other states in that category. The only other state 
with a higher emissions increase for the period 2005-2010 is Idaho (8.1%), but this figure is 
somewhat misleading because its actual amount of carbon emissions (0.05 MMTCO2) is 
extremely small and essentially flat and, more importantly, it is not significant compared to the 
average for all states (-2.7 MMTCO2).   
Mississippi can therefore serve as a benchmark for “do-nothing” climate policies relative 
to almost every other state in the nation. Mississippi is a relatively poor state, and much of its 
lack of policy innovation and minimal investment in renewable energy for the future, along with 
a deeply conservative politics, is tied to its high level of poverty. According to the Census 
Bureau, Mississippi is the poorest state in the U.S. (Census 2007). Twenty-two percent of 




(Sauter 2012). Many more residents hover just above the poverty line and struggle for self-
sufficiency. Many Mississippians are dependent on state and federal welfare programs. In 2012, 
one in five Mississippians received food stamps, the highest rate of reliance on food assistance in 
the nation.   
 
Lack of Emissions Regulation 
 On the state spectrum of emissions levels and climate change policy, Mississippi is the 
poster child for inaction and lack of reform.  A brief look at the energy and emissions policies of 
Mississippi shows the reasons for this. The Institute for Energy Research publishes 
comprehensive assessments of every state’s energy generation profile and a list of “regulatory 
impediments to affordable energy.” Since most states still produce the majority of their energy 
by burning coal and natural gas, emissions-cutting regulations on power plants will marginally 
increase the cost of energy. Many states have decided that this is a reasonable cost to incur to 
mitigate the greenhouse gases that cause global warming, but Mississippi is not one of them. It 
has avoided adding these types of costs that many other states are implementing. Below is the list 
of facts by the Institute for Energy Research about Mississippi’s regulatory environment that 
likely affects the cost of energy or the cost of using energy (IER 2009): 
-­‐ Mississippi does not cap greenhouse gas emissions. 
-­‐ Mississippi is not a member of a regional agreement to cap greenhouse gas emissions. 
-­‐ Mississippi does not require utilities to sell a certain percentage of electricity from 
renewable sources. 
-­‐ Mississippi does not require gasoline to be mixed with renewable fuels. 
-­‐ Mississippi does not impose automobile fuel economy standards similar to 





-­‐ Mississippi does not require new residential and commercial buildings to meet energy 
efficiency standards.  
-­‐ Mississippi does not impose state-based appliance efficiency standards. 
-­‐ Mississippi does not allow utilities to “decouple” revenue from the sale of electricity 
and natural gas. Some states decouple revenue from actual sales, allowing utilities to 
increase their revenue by selling less electricity and natural gas. 
Mississippi is therefore a robust example of what a state’s emissions and energy profile looks 
like when it implements essentially zero regulation. Mississippi is highly dependent on domestic 
and international imports of coal to produce electricity, importing nearly three quarters of the 
coal its power plants burned in 2008 at a cost of $457 million (UCS Mississippi 2009). In fact, 
Mississippi is the fourth most dependent state on foreign coal imports, with most of its overseas 
imports coming from Colombia (SB Mississippi 2010).   
 
Factors for Lack of Policy Implementation 
Cronyism and Inefficiency 
The state’s dependence on coal is also related to its pervasive culture of cronyism among 
its business elites, a practice that encourages corporate welfare since many businesses are 
subsidized by public tax revenue. These companies are ostensibly subsidized with the hope that 
they will create jobs and lift people out of poverty. But these jobs sometimes require more 
education than those in poverty have or are able to obtain.  Some crony-inspired subsidies also 
put a greater financial burden on those they were intended to help. For example, the $4-billion 
Kemper coal plant built by Mississippi Power Company was supposed to bring jobs and industry 
to an economically depressed area (SW Kemper 2013). But critics contend that the Kemper plant 
is bringing dramatic energy rate increases to local customers, many of whom are poor and unable 
to afford larger utility payments (Williams 2012). Other examples include the many green energy 




companies require highly specialized, skilled labor and human capital. According to the Center 
for Business and Economic Research, however, Mississippi consistently receives a failing grade 
for human capital and efficiency (CBER Mississippi 2014). Thus, cronyism not only has 
negative effects on jobs and poverty levels in a state like Mississippi, it can also disrupt and 
delay efforts to promote renewable energy that would boost a state’s economy and help mitigate 
high levels of carbon emissions.   
 
Georgia 
Factors for Lower Emissions 
Drop in Coal Capacity 
 The emissions profile of Georgia shows an altogether different and surprising outcome in 
recent years. Georgia scores as low as possible (a “0”) on the policy involvement scale but has 
still unexpectedly managed to cut emissions in order to comply with federal rules aimed at 
reducing air pollution mainly from aging coal-fired power plants (AJC.com). In January of 2013 
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Georgia Power, the state’s largest power utility, 
would shut down 15 coal and oil-fired units in response to new federal standards. But this was 
one of the most recent examples of a drop in coal power capacity on a longer-term trend that 
stretches back to at least 2007. In 2012 the Atlanta Journal-Constitution documented that “the 
amount of coal that Georgia Power uses to produce electricity stands at 47 percent, down from 
70 percent five years ago” (Ibid). Therefore, the announcement by Southern Co., the parent 




continuation of a movement—at first reluctant but eventually somewhat dedicated—to move 
away from coal both for health and economic reasons.   
 Georgia Power made up for some of the closed coal plants with the expansion of the 
nuclear Plant Vogtle, and buying natural gas from a sister company Southern Power (AJC.com).  
The combination of anticipation of forthcoming federal rules on emissions from coal plants and 
concern over health effect from coal prompted Georgia to move away from coal without the kind 
of emission-cutting policies and climate change-conscious elected representatives present in 
other states. This type of response from a state situated more on the “inaction” side of the climate 
change policy spectrum is slowly becoming more common for a variety of reasons. States and 
utilities are tempering their resistance to new EPA standards to cut carbon emissions, and some 
states have begun coordinating with EPA over proposed new rules for existing coal-fired power 
plants that will be put in place by 2015-2016 (NCSL 2014).   
There has been a shift in momentum for support of new rules for coal-generated 
electricity—the single largest stationary source of emissions in the U.S.—as natural gas prices 
have fallen, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) costs have lowered, and markets for 
greenhouse gas offsets have expanded. Some of this momentum shift is also due to a change in 
perception of regulations that will put a price on carbon: whereas only a few years ago many 
industries and lawmakers saw such regulation as radical and unlikely to gain traction, today the 
idea of using markets to end the practice of polluting carbon free of charge is becoming much 
more acceptable if not inevitable. The clear and extensive findings of large-scale reports from the 
U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2013 and the U.S. National Climate 
Assessment (NCA) in 2014 have effectively ended any legitimate debate about the science of 




EPA rules under the authority granted by the Clean Air Act that Congress passed in the 1970s 
(IPCC WG1 2014). But even before this latest push to use executive authority to cut carbon 
emissions, states like Georgia have been taking steps to address climate change in response to 
local environmental problems. 
 
Water Conservation and Energy Efficiency 
At the State Capitol in Atlanta, the focus was shifting toward environmental issues as 
well, and the Chair of the Senate’s Committee on Natural Resources and the Environment, Ross 
Tolleson, was ramping up legislation for water conservation and energy efficiency. In an 
interview with Senator Tolleson’s Chief Legislative Assistant, Vicki Gibbs, it became clear that 
the new concern the people of Georgia were having over the state of the local environment 
offered a platform for much needed reform. When asked about the current state of climate 
change policy in Georgia and its relationship to the drought, Vicki Gibbs was unequivocal:   
“The main issue is water.  That’s the biggie.  Droughts have been prominent in 
current legislation, but the issue of carbon emissions and energy conservation are 
never put on the back burner.   
Carbon emissions have come down as a result of efficiency legislation and 
voluntary industry compliance. But it is hard to tell which has had a greater effect. 
[The] Regulated industries committee is also where these sorts of policies are 
happening.” 
The shift that the state of Georgia made toward sustainability was a result of numerous 
interconnected events. Part of the shift was due to the retirement of 12 old, dirty coal-fired power 
plants across the state.  This event was also a major contributor to Georgia’s emissions cuts for 




also strongly forced state legislators to focus on environmental issues, specifically water 
conservation (Kundell 2009). Indeed, there are few key examples of laws that the state 
legislature passed to conserve water, such as: The 2007-2009 Drought in Athens, Georgia, 
United States: A Climatological Analysis and an Assessment of Future Water Availability, 
(Campana et al. 2012). By the time the drought depleted the reservoirs in the Atlanta 
Metropolitan area, many lawmakers and residents were reluctantly coming to recognize their 
vulnerability to environmental hazards like droughts and prolonged heat waves (Chaisson 2012).  
Many of the regulatory measures that originated with the drought and grew out of a desire to 
address the state’s vulnerability to water scarcity have “impacted the population’s attitudes and 
behaviors toward water consumption” (Ibid) and have nudged Georgia down a path of more 
environmental conservation. 
 
Factors for Policy Implementation 
Drought Awareness and Weather Whiplash 
 Reporting about the drought in the Southeast that began in 2007 was extensive and dire 
(AP Georgia 2007). This led to a heightened awareness among residents of their growing 
vulnerability to environmental impacts. Factors of water scarcity in Georgia include increased 
per capita demand due to the population growth of Atlanta and other cities like Athens, conflicts 
with neighboring states over Georgia’s largest water supply, the Chattahoochee River, 
increasingly frequent droughts like the one seen in 2007, and government policies that did not 
adequately prepare the state for these types of environmental stresses. Other studies find that 
population growth and development—which increase demand on water resources—have brought 




planning for a drought with such widespread effects served as a catalyst for new laws and 
policies focused on water conservation and environmental sustainability (AP Georgia 2007).  
These new steps include mandatory restrictions on certain types of water use, giveaways or 
rebates of water-saving devices for everything from showerheads to toilets, educational programs 
that extend from the federal to the local level and the adoption of water rates designed to 
discourage excessive use. The drought and concern over environmental issues that found 
renewed attention also prompted the creation of the Georgia Climate Change Coalition (GCCC 
2014) whose mission states that: 
“Through education, advocacy and action, the Georgia Climate Change Coalition 
aims to increase awareness about climate change and its projected impacts; work 
in  partnership with all Georgians and stakeholders to promote solutions and 
adaptations to the climate crisis; actively support local, state, national and 
international energy/climate change initiatives and legislation; serve as a clearing 
house for climate information.” 
The drought had severe local impacts on drinking water supplies, agriculture and recreation, and 
also exacerbated existing risk of increased illness and death due to greater summer heat stress 
(UCS Georgia 2009). However, one of the positive effects the drought had on the Southeast and 
especially the state of Georgia is an inadvertent attention to environmental and climate-related 
issues that until then were not taken seriously in local policy making. Moreover, by 2009 and 
2010 the drought had not only ended but the entire region was set upon by once-in-a-century 
flooding (Romm 2009), an event that displayed another phenomenon of climate change known 
as weather whiplash (Freedman 2009) and caused the state to continue to focus on climate 
change adaptation. As the name suggests, this type of weather sequencing can occur on a short, 
medium or long-term basis, but is always characterized by an unusually rapid transition from one 




drought—to another.  Such wild swings from extreme drought to extreme flooding are becoming 
more common in a warmer world (Romm 2009). 
 
Tennessee (Not a case study, but interesting outlier) 
Factors for Lower Emissions 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
 The state of Tennessee was originally going to be the sixth case study for this project, but 
due to its unique outlier status among the other states in its group—i.e., states that scored “0” on 
the policy participation scale—it is not a representative example of a state that lowered its carbon 
emissions despite a lack of climate policy engagement. To be sure, Tennessee significantly 
lowered its emissions from the electric power sector for the period 2005-2010: it did so by 21 
percent whereas the next highest reduction figure is for Georgia at 6.9 percent for reasons 
discussed above. However, the circumstances for Tennessee’s outlier status depend mainly on 
the presence of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an electric power utility unique among 
the states for its high level of diversified generation sources, including high proportions of 
hydropower and nuclear. So while the presence of the TVA is a good thing for a state like 
Tennessee to continue to lower its emissions, its unique history and geography make it difficult 
to apply those emission outcomes to other states or the nation as a whole. There are a few useful 
lessons learned from Tennessee’s experience that we can look at briefly before moving on to our 
final case study. 
 The TVA is by far the largest energy provider in Tennessee and also serves many of the 




electricity, and above all economic development and jobs to an underdeveloped region, the TVA 
is still the largest regional planning agency and maintains a wide mix of fossil fuel, hydro and 
nuclear power facilities. This large presence of non-fossil fuel energy sources has positioned the 
TVA as one of the more sustainable utilities in the country. The emissions rates and 
environmental impact of the TVA facilities are monitored by the Tennessee Department of 
Environment and Conservation (DEC).   
 
Fuel Switching and Monitoring 
In an interview, Geryl Stewart, the program manager for compliance at the Tennessee 
DEC, noted a number of different, interrelated factors that account for the state’s drop in carbon 
emissions. The largest CO2 emitters in the TVA fleet are the fossil fuel plants, but TVA has been 
voluntarily switching from coal to natural gas when renovating old facilities or building new 
ones. This has come partly because of the lower recent prices of natural gas thanks to the 
nationwide hydrofracking boom, and party from anticipation and uncertainty over what future 
GHG legislation might be. This is indicative of a larger trend happening elsewhere in the country 
of utilities voluntarily switching to lower emissions power sources in anticipation of future EPA 
regulations. The Boston-based group Clean Air Task Force (CATF 2014) has found that 
swapping power generated from the dirtiest coal-fired power plants for cleaner-burning natural 
gas would help states meet new regulations for GHG emissions. The CATF found that a 
relatively small amount of switching from coal to natural gas could help achieve a 27 percent cut 
in carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector by 2020, compared with 2005 levels. At the 
same time it would prevent electricity rates from rising more than 2 percent. This type of 




climate change mitigation—as opposed to expensive carbon capture and sequestration this is as 
yet unproven at a large scale—and it is a strategy that some states and utilities are putting into 
place as they expect the EPA to eventually issue new standards. The study by the CATF showed 
that the easiest and most affordable way for states to achieve these standards would be for them 
to be assigned a carbon emission budget by the EPA, a so-called “cap” on the amount of carbon 
they can pump into the atmosphere. They would then be able to participate in emissions credit 
trading schemes that encourage operators to switch from dispatching power from inefficient old 
coal plants to underused natural gas plants. 
The TVA also has had an advantage simply in its ability to monitor CO2 emissions 
compared to other states without the same kind of air quality detection systems. As Geryl 
Stewart of the DEC notes:  
“The biggest electric provider is TVA.  Everything comes from them.  A lot of complex 
reasons.  CO2 has been monitored only recently, we have spent years monitoring S and N 
oxides under Acid Rain Act that makes it easier and more efficient to monitor CO2.” 
This means that once the TVA was convinced that cutting CO2 emissions would be an important 
part of its future environmental compliance, it quickly began to expand its existing sulphur and 
nitrogen monitoring equipment to include CO2. The better monitoring capability allowed the 
TVA to cut emissions more efficiently once it decided to make this transition. There was also a 
new nuclear power plant coming on line. This can cut emissions but is also a perennial “not in 
my back yard (NIMBY)” problem that makes constructing new nuclear plants very difficult.  
Additionally, the TVA has a negotiated consent order with the EPA over its use of old coal-fired 
power plants. So the presence of the TVA has allowed for a much higher degree of 
diversification in Tennessee’s energy market. However, this TVA-based energy profile is unique 





Factors for Lower Emissions 
Hydrofracking and Cheap Natural Gas 
 The state of North Dakota is the sixth and final case study for this project.  Among the 
group of states that scored “0” on the policy participation scale, North Dakota had a surprising 
6.5 percent drop in electric power sector carbon emissions from 2005 to 2010, behind only 
Tennessee and Georgia (21 and 6.9 percent reductions, respectively). North Dakota has been at 
the epicenter of the shale gas hydrofracking boom that has revamped the entire U.S. energy 
market over the past few years. This market-driven shift in the electric utility industry from coal 
to natural gas has been the largest contributing factor to drop in North Dakota’s carbon emissions.   
 While North Dakota has recently found itself in the middle of the renaissance of fossil 
fuel production in the U.S., it is important to recognize that on a regional basis, different parts of 
the country have all been experiencing declines in their emissions due to varying factors (EIA 
Midwest 2014). Drivers of faster, larger emissions declines in the Northeast include extensive 
urbanization, translating into denser, more energy-efficient population centers, and increasingly 
low-carbon electricity generation from natural gas, nuclear, and renewables, instead of coal. The 
Northeast includes the top-three lowest emitting states per unit of economic output (New York, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts) and two of the top-five states with the cleanest electricity 
sources (Vermont and New Hampshire) (EIA Environment 2014). Compared to the Northeast, 
the other regions (Midwest, West, and South) have more diverse state-level characteristics, 
which contributed to relatively slower net emissions declines. Steep emissions reductions in 
some states were partially offset by escalating emissions elsewhere. States like Wyoming (West), 




production, higher and less efficient energy use in more sparsely populated areas, and heavily 
coal-reliant electricity generation compared to other states in those regions. 
 
Lower Relative Use of Coal 
 But North Dakota’s continued reliance on coal remains high only relative to other states, 
and in fact has remained constant relative to the North Dakota’s use of natural gas. North Dakota 
still has a high carbon emissions rate on a per-capita basis—it ranks second among all states—
but this is mainly due to its relatively small, diffuse population and high energy production levels.  
In addition, North Dakota, along with most other Midwestern states, uses coal at a higher rate 
than the national average (Anderson 2013). But even considering these facts that indicate North 
Dakota’s continuing reliance on and growing promotion of fossil fuels, coal is still “becoming a 
smaller part of the power mix, with natural gas and renewable sources such as wind becoming a 
larger part of the mix” (emphasis added, Ibid). Indeed, North Dakota’s coal use dropped from 
87.5 percent to 67.1 percent for the period from 2000 to 2010 while its use of renewables rose 
from 0.2 percent to 23.2 percent. During the same period the use of natural gas, much of it 
produced in the Bakken oil and gas field of North Dakota, increased in the entire Midwestern 
region (Dobb 2013).   
 The rise in production of natural gas from hydrofracking in North Dakota is becoming a 
microcosm of the overall situation in the U.S., and one of the most important factors—along with 
the economic downturn of 2008-2009—for why total carbon emissions have declined. Total U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, including carbon dioxide, methane and other pollutants, dropped 4.5 
percent from 2011 to 2012, according to EPA data, echoing an EIA report issued in 2013 




2012 (EIA Environment 2013). The EPA’s 2-year-old Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program 
collects annual emissions data from about 8,000 industrial pollutant-emitting facilities 
nationwide. Since 2010, the program’s data have shown that GHG emissions from power plants 
have decreased 10 percent because natural gas is competing with coal as the primary electricity 
generation fuel source in the U.S. (Magill 2013) 
Natural gas has continued to fall in price and to undercut coal in energy markets due to 
the proliferation of hydrofracking. However, a major unknown factor surrounding hydrofracking 
is the quantity of unburned “fugitive methane” that is released during the process. This is a 
critical question because methane is on average twenty times more potent as a greenhouse gas 
than carbon dioxide, so it has a high potential to cancel out any emissions reductions brought on 
by switching to lower emissions fuels. A 2011 study in the Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences illustrates the importance of accounting for methane leakage across the value chain 
of natural gas (i.e. production, processing and delivery) when considering fuel-switching 
scenarios from gasoline, diesel fuel and coal to natural gas (Alvarez 2011). Taking into account 
the potential for methane leakage, the paper finds that, assuming the EPA’s 2009 leakage rate of 
2.4% from well to city, new natural gas combined cycle power plants reduce climate impacts 
compared to new coal plants; this case is true as long as leakage remains under 3.2%. Therefore, 
there is a maximum rate of leakage for methane drilling that is acceptable within the larger 
requirement to “reduce climate impacts” while replacing coal with gas. This finding essentially 
defines a critical energy tradeoff, albeit with a call for better emissions data on methane leakage. 
The tradeoff is between allowing for more fracking and therefore more fugitive methane, as long 
as the combined effects of those emissions—from both methane and CO2 are less than those 




Factors for Policy Implementation 
“Bridge” from Coal to Gas 
North Dakota, however, has by no means abandoned coal. To the contrary, it effectively 
has no state-based or regional emissions rules to abide by that would stop it from using coal 
(though this will change to some extent with the new rules proposed in 2014 by the EPA). It has 
instead augmented its energy profile with cheap gas and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.  But as the local newspaper, The Bismarck Tribune, has noted, North Dakota 
is in a “unique situation, facing higher power demands as more people move” to the state 
(Holdman 2014). Based on EIA data, the article notes two critical data points about North 
Dakota: “North Dakota has the second-highest carbon emission rate attributable to coal power in 
the nation, behind Mississippi. North Dakota also is the second-largest exporter of electricity to 
other states behind Wyoming.” That is, much of North Dakota’s emissions result from producing 
electricity that it exports to other states, but an increasing share of this energy is now being 
consumed within the state’s borders.   
Cheap natural gas has been characterized as a “bridge” fuel source, helping to facilitate 
the transition from conventional fossil fuels to more abundant and cheaper renewable energy 
from wind, solar and geothermal (Krupnick et al. 2014). With the ultimate goal of reducing 
carbon emissions, the revolution in hydrofracking appears to be a positive turn of events, if in 
fact it allows for more coal to be replaced by natural gas. But the reality of the situation is far 
more complex than simply calculating how much coal is being supplanted by gas. According to 
the Energy Information Administration, coal generation peaked in 2007 at a little over two 
billion megawatt hours, and subsequently in 2013 it dropped to 1.58 billion megawatt hours (EIA 




and ended at 1.2 billion. If the total amount of increase in gas-fired electricity generation 
replaced coal, then the switch produced savings of 113.1 million tons of carbon a year. But 
natural gas is starting to replace nuclear power, which can be seen as wiping out about 10 percent 
of the savings, because a nuclear power plant essentially has no carbon footprint. In 2013, five 
nuclear power plants announced plans to close, and attributed the reasons to “slimmer margins 
for nuclear operators in a low natural-gas price environment” (McMahon 2013). Some had 
mechanical problems or political opposition, while others did not seem to have such acute causes 
for shutdown.  But the drop in prices on the wholesale market—caused primarily by low natural 
gas prices—was a challenge for all of them.   
In addition to the issue of fugitive methane—still a topic of much debate and ongoing 
research—a significant portion of the natural gas extracted during the process of hydrofracking 
for crude oil is simply burned, or flared, adding to the carbon intensity of this now-common 
extraction method (Oldham 2014). Such widespread flaring is the upshot of many new 
hydrofracking operations located in remote areas without pipelines. The only way to transport oil 
to market from these fields is by truck, but it is uneconomical to ship natural gas in this manner, 
so companies simply flare it off as an unsaleable byproduct.   
 
Effects on Investment in Renewable Energy 
Another important impact of the flood of abundant, cheap natural gas in the energy 
markets is its potentially adverse effects on investment in renewables. Researchers at Duke 
University, presenting their findings in a paper published in Environmental Science and 
Technology, show that the current low price of natural gas has displaced some investment in 




gas—a phenomenon occurring now with no signs of slowing—slightly increases overall energy 
use over time and can encourage fuel switching from coal to gas. However, it is unclear whether 
this change ultimately results in lower or higher greenhouse gas emissions: that is, switching 
from coal to gas will reduce emissions, but cheaper gas supplies might increase demand and 
consumption, thus negating any initial emissions cuts. Kenneth Kimmel, the president of the 
Union of Concerned Scientists told the New York Times in June 2014 that “there is no question 
that depressed natural gas prices have had an adverse effect on the wind and solar industries… 
It’s stunting zero-carbon alternatives,” adding that “low natural gas prices decrease the benefit of 
energy-efficiency investments as well” (Wald 2014). So the “bridge” that cheap natural gas 
represents in the energy policy transition both in the U.S. and around the globe is at best a 
double-edged sword. Its abundance and relatively low cost puts a “price squeeze” on coal, 
historically cheap but becoming less competitive. Cheap gas, however, is also having a similar 
effect on renewables, the kinds of zero-emissions fuel sources societies need to scale up 
substantially in order to mitigate climate change. Ultimately, North Dakota’s vanguard role in 
the growth of hydrofracking exemplifies the dubious role of relying on natural gas to lower 













The Case Studies Revisited 
 The six case study states tell a variety of stories about the effects that different climate 
and energy policies have on the direction and size of a state’s carbon emissions. New York State 
tells the story of how participation in a successful regional emissions trading program—
combined with policies to cut back on coal-fired power plants and a temporary economic 
slowdown—can make dramatic reductions in the carbon footprint from state’s power sector. The 
state of Mississippi almost entirely lacks policies to cut carbon intensity in its energy sector, and 
lies on the lower end of the emissions policy spectrum. Mississippi, however, tells a similar story 
to that of New York in that they both yield predictable results in terms of the outcomes of their 
emissions policies. That is, New York’s policy ranking is high and its emissions predictably went 
down, and Mississippi’s policy ranking is low and its emissions predictably went up. The four 
other case study states yield surprising results because their emissions trajectories do not readily 
match their levels of policy involvement. Oregon and Iowa both have strong climate action plans 
and have made political strides to address climate change, yet both states experienced a rise in 
carbon emissions during the 2005-2010 period of analysis. Georgia and North Dakota also yield 
surprising results because despite the fact that neither state has strong climate mitigation policies, 
both states managed to lower their emissions.  
This discussion chapter will identify the factors that influenced the ups and downs in state 
emissions levels. Every state has its own unique set of policies and circumstances that determine 
the types of energy sources it uses to produce electricity—i.e. coal, natural gas, nuclear or 
renewables—which can generally predict the amount and trajectory of its carbon emissions. 




implementation of new air and water conservation laws—occur in multiple states and have 
similar effects, so we can draw general conclusions about the effectiveness certain policies have 
on reducing emissions. We can also look at the states where some or all of these policies are 
absent and make inferences about the potential impact emissions-reduction policies could have in 
these states. A clear understanding of how these factors can raise or lower a state’s emissions 
will allow us to broaden the analysis to a national scale. 
 
Main Factors That Cause States To Lower Emissions 
 The findings in the previous chapter show a handful of factors related to states’ regional 
policies, economic health, energy profile, conservation laws, and their geography and history that 
can contribute to lower carbon emissions from the electricity sector. One of the most prominent 
factors is whether a state belongs to a regional cap and trade program, such as the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast. Cap and trade programs give large networks 
of emitters (i.e. coal-fired power plants) opportunities to efficiently trade carbon credits by 
creating a larger market-based system of buyers and sellers than would not be possible without 
regional coordination. These types of programs create exchanges that allow older, higher 
polluting power plants to buy carbon credits and avoid fines, while allowing newer, more 
efficient power plants to sell their credits and take advantage of the economic policy incentive to 
emit less carbon in the atmosphere (Byrne et al. 2007). Membership in a regional emissions 
trading program is so significant to a state’s ability to cut emissions that it is used as one of the 
main criteria for classifying a state as “green” in Wheeler’s (2010) ranking system. This project 
created a new, hybrid ranking system by adopting Wheeler’s system for classifying states as 




deep political and industry commitment to a cap and trade system—in this case RGGI—has 
greatly reduced its emissions (McKinstry 2004).  
In a major challenge for economic policymakers who wish to use market-based solutions 
and regulations to lower carbon emissions, slow economic growth and recession can be factors 
that contribute to lowering emissions. For policymakers, if the goal is to cut emissions, it is not a 
viable to policy to meet that goal by hampering growth. Economic growth has historically been 
associated with the burning of fossil fuels—i.e., greater industrial energy demand means more 
power generation and higher GDP output—so it makes sense that in an electricity market still 
dominated by coal and natural gas, lower demand would translate to lower emissions (Rabe 
2002). This poses a problem for policymakers who seek to increase economic growth, create 
more jobs, and cut emissions at the same time. The linkage between growth and emissions is part 
of the larger problem of balancing climate change mitigation with maintaining and raising 
economic output: there is little appetite for cutting emissions if that means harming the economy, 
even if the impacts from climate change end up costing more in the long term. But carbon 
emissions are not an inherent aspect of economic growth per se; they are only connected to 
growth in a carbon-based economy. As renewable energy continues to expand its share of the 
electricity market, power demand may keep rising while emissions stay flat or decline over time 
(Mooney 2015). Renewables have the added advantage that once the infrastructure is built for 
utility-scale solar, wind and geothermal power plants, the energy needed to fuel the production of 
electricity is virtually free compared with the high commodity prices for coal, natural gas and oil. 
In other words, fuel costs for renewable energy are zero since they are sustainable resources 
(sunlight, wind and water power), while fossil fuel costs are substantial due to capital-intensive 
mining and drilling operations. Whereas economic slowdown has been associated with lower 




important as renewable energy continues to accelerate its replacement of fossil fuels in the 
electricity markets.  
A critical factor that led to drop in emissions from states like Georgia and North Dakota 
was lower coal use (Coburn 2009). Georgia closed a number of coal-fired power plants 
following a prolonged drought in the early 2000s as part of larger state legislation meant to boost 
environmental and water conservation. The measures Georgia took to address its vulnerabilities 
after the drought were somewhat out of character for a so-called “brown” state with a 
Republican-led Congressional delegation. But public support for and rapid passage of better 
environmental policies during the drought had more impact on Georgia’s emissions than any 
change in the state’s policy ranking (Kousky et al. 2003). Relatively rapid changes in local and 
state laws in response to regional environmental stresses—like droughts and floods exacerbated 
by climate change—could be a predictor for a lowering of emissions in a brown state that 
otherwise would see its emissions rise. 
It is no surprise that such a major public issue like a crippling drought in Georgia would 
help trigger a significant change in public policy. As Georgia residents began rationing water and 
feeling other direct impacts of the drought—and as media coverage of the drought grew—the 
public appetite for a strong policy response started to outweigh the “brown” state politics that 
had previously prevented Georgia from enacting any serious climate change mitigation policies. 
In effect, the realities of extreme weather impacts associated with climate change were enough 
for the affected population to demand action, and for their local representatives to reverse course 
and put in place new environmental protections. So from the outside, Georgia’s drop in 
emissions would appear surprising given its lack of climate policies and Congressional 




measures and its closing of coal-fired power plants is less surprising when we take the larger 
context of the drought into account. 
This is an important finding in that is shows the potential for actual climate impacts—like 
droughts, floods, and other extreme weather events—to override a state’s engrained political 
resistance to policies that would lower emissions. Accurate media coverage of the potential 
climate links to extreme weather can also help move public opinion in favor of climate action. 
This, however, must be tempered with the fact that the media often creates a sense of false 
balance by reporting on climate change as if its cause—two centuries of human-made carbon 
emissions—were still up for scientific debate. In fact, 97 percent of climate scientists agree that 
the current rise in average global temperatures is completely attributable to human emissions 
(NASA GCC 2015). The ability for extreme weather to focus public attention on climate change 
is real: Hurricane Sandy, which devastated the New York metropolitan region in 2012 through 
coastal flooding, continues to be a the rationale for billions of dollars of sea level rise adaptation 
projects along the New York and New Jersey coasts (Jervey 2013).  
North Dakota’s drop in emissions was not a result of newfound concerns over climate 
impacts, but instead came about largely thanks to the rapid growth of hydrofracking that 
prompted the state’s energy industry to transition from mining coal to drilling for oil and natural 
gas. North Dakota used to have substantial coal mines similar to those of neighboring states 
Montana and Wyoming, but in the early 2000s found itself in the middle of a new fossil fuel 
energy revolution centered around hydrofracking for oil and gas in the Bakken shale formation 
(Lutsey and Sperling 2007). This switch from coal to gas, while still carbon-intensive and not 
driven by a concern over mitigating climate change, nonetheless allowed North Dakota to lower 




Main Factors That Cause States To Raise Emissions 
 The analysis in the previous chapter identified factors that caused emissions to increase in 
“surprising” cases for states with strong climate policies and in “unsurprising” cases for states 
with virtually no policies to limit carbon pollution.  Of the surprising cases, Oregon stands out 
because its strong credentials as a “green” state were not sufficient to keep its emissions from 
rising. Oregon’s use of biofuels to replace natural gas as a fuelstock for producing electricity is 
the main reason for the subsequent rise in emissions. Moreover, Oregon chose to adopt biofuels 
as part of an environmentally conscious strategy meant to wean it off fossil fuels. Ironically, the 
state achieved a level of fossil fuel independence, but by replacing much of this capacity with 
biofuels it did not reduce carbon emissions (Goulder et al. 2008). This suggests that for other 
states—and the nation as a whole—that wish to lower their emissions levels by modernizing 
their electric power sectors, carbon neutral technologies like wind and solar power are superior 
to biofuels that in fact cause emissions to increase. 
 Another factor in Oregon’s emissions increase is population growth. An increase in the 
number of energy consumers in a state would logically tend to raise that state’s emissions, 
especially if most energy production is carbon-intensive and nonrenewable (Peterson 2004). It is 
difficult to ascribe an exact proportion of emissions rise to population growth, but this factor 
implies that even for states with significant carbon emissions policies, a growing population and 
high energy consumption could counteract other measures to lower emissions, all else being 
equal. 
 Finally, there are a few other important factors that can cause states to increase their 
emissions. Reliance on coal as the main source of electric power is the most common of these, 




that score high on climate policy yet still retain much of their coal-based energy infrastructure 
(Burtraw 2011). Mississippi is the most straightforward example of a state with virtually no 
climate policy or emissions cutting strategy, and its reliance on and use of coal remains high. 
Deep economic poverty, inefficiency in power generation and distribution, and a lack of 
emissions regulation are all factors that also have contributed to Mississippi’s high level of 
emissions (Peel et al. 2012). Iowa, on the other hand, has a high policy participation ranking, but 
that seems to be more a reflection of the state’s liberal politics, whereas many local coal-fired 
power plants have been allowed to remain online and are major sources of pollution. That along 
with emissions from Iowa’s agricultural sector has produced emissions levels in that state that 
are far higher than its policy participation ranking would suggest (Wheeler 2010).  
 
Implications of the Findings 
Given what we know about the contributing factors to states’ emissions levels, we can 
take a step back and ask a set of broad questions about what these findings imply: Is it possible 
and potentially useful to expand the findings about which policies worked for the selected states, 
and generalize some of the results for the country as a whole? After looking at the six case 
studies in depth by using the methodology of ranking them by their level of policy involvement, 
we are able to identify the states that follow the general trends of “more policy, lower emissions” 
and “less policy, higher emissions,” i.e. the “unsurprising” states. The majority of states fall in 
this category because in general there is a predicable relationship between emissions policies and 
actual emissions; that is, the presence of effective policies on coal use, cap and trade, energy 
consumption, etc. usually equates to lower levels of carbon emissions. However, this relationship 




“surprising” states—show that sometimes the presence of good climate policies does not lower 
emissions as much as expected, and sometime emissions rise in spite of the policy’s intent. On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, a state’s emissions can fall even in the absence of robust 
climate policy.  
What are the larger implications of the findings for the unsurprising states like New York 
and Mississippi, and the surprising states like Oregon and Georgia? The results for the majority 
of all 50 states are unsurprising in that most states follow the general rule that the more they do 
to implement climate change mitigation policies, the more likely it is that they will lower their 
emissions. One of the goals of this project is to look at the surprising results from the states that 
go against the general trend of “more climate policies, lower carbon emissions” in order to 
understand the circumstances that create these outliers. So the ranking system yields a reliable 
method for predicting whether a state’s emissions will go up or down over a given period of time. 
But the system is clearly not foolproof, and there are some states whose policies make it appear 
as though its emissions would fall when in fact they rose, and vice versa. We can therefore 
identify particular attributes of state policy that have the opposite effect of the initial prediction. 
For example, the use of biofuels to generate electricity in Oregon had the unintended effect of 
raising emissions, while the adoption of water conservation legislation and the closing of coal-
fired power plants in Georgia in response to a prolonged drought lowered emissions in a state 
with otherwise weak climate policies.  
The continued reliance on coal in Iowa to generate power despite that state’s high level of 
policy involvement raised its emissions despite the prevalence of “green” policies in that state. 
And the rapid transition from coal to hydrofracked natural gas in North Dakota allowed that state 




implies that some of the same kinds of policies for environmental conservation, fuel switching, 
or the lack thereof could have a similar impact on emissions in other states. This has larger 
implications for an eventual federal carbon emissions policy, and supports the theory that states 
act as “policy laboratories” for the slower-moving federal government and can guide the 
formation of more effective national regulations.  
The wide range of outcomes of emissions policies among the case studies indicates that a 
patchwork of state policies is less efficient than an overall federal policy on emissions, a national 
goal the Environmental Protection Agency is currently trying to implement. But can we 
reasonably speculate about other states, and the whole country, given what we know about the 
six case studies? We can learn the lessons from the case studies and posit some general theories. 
Though the generalizations may not necessarily prove that all of these policies are completely 
effective, analyzing where and how they apply can validate a number of larger conclusions about 
which climate policies succeed in cutting emissions. The state ranking system shows that most of 
the states that have enacted climate change mitigation policies, belong to regional emissions-
cutting programs and have national elected officials that voted for federal climate action have 
been more successful in lowering their emissions than states that rank low on the policy scale 









Project Goal and Theoretical Frameworks Revisited 
 The goal of this project was to identify states with emissions-cutting polices that work, 
and to understand how economic and political factors affect different states’ approaches to 
climate change policy. The ranking system was successful in showing which states had the 
highest and lowest levels of policy participation, and which states stood out within those 
groupings due to unexpected emissions policy outcomes. The project also showed that just 
because a state has a robust set of climate policies—for example, Oregon—that does not 
necessarily guarantee it success in cutting carbon emissions. Moreover, states that have weak or 
nonexistent climate policies—for example, Georgia—might still be able to cut their emissions 
thanks to unforeseen consequences of short-term policy changes. These examples support one of 
the theoretical frameworks on which this project is based; that is, that states often function as 
“policy laboratories” for implementing new regulations that might serve as models for federal 
action (Pew 2005). Scholars have labeled this practice “environmental federalism” (Burtraw 
2011; Goulder et al. 2008), and it offers a way to understand and analyze states as proving 
grounds for “social and economic experiments” (Peterson 2004, 93). It is easier to implement a 
policy on a smaller scale—like a city or a state—and measure its effects than it is to do so on a 
national level, but there are tradeoffs involved in changing the geographic scale of a policy. A 
decentralized, bottom-up approach is more flexible but might not capture a sufficient proportion 
of an entire country to be effective on a large scale. A standardized, top-down approach would in 
theory be more efficient and encompass an entire country, but its implementation would be more 
difficult given the economic diversity of the states and political inertia of the federal government. 




variety of states and to theorize that those could be translated—as flexibly as possible through 
concessions for high-emitting states, for example—to a national level. 
 While there are obstacles to applying these lessons learned from the states to the national 
level, this project’s analysis of specific polices and their influence on state emissions levels 
builds on the theoretical framework of Rabe (2004) that uses the “case study approach” for states 
as the basic unit for policy evaluation. Rabe’s critical, widely cited central work in the field 
“Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy” 
shows the growing importance of state level policy action in the absence of unifying federal 
climate legislation, and is a theoretical foundation for this project. The results of this project 
contribute to that theory by showing that is it useful to use states as case studies to understand the 
emissions-reduction potential of specific climate polices, such as membership in a cap and trade 
program or the use of state-mandated greenhouse gas inventories. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate that we can use the case study approach to identify factors that have a surprising or 
unintended impact on emissions, like the growth of hydrofracking that displaced coal in North 
Dakota—thus lowering its emissions—or the continued reliance on coal-fired power plants in 
Iowa that kept that state’s emissions high despite its high ranking in climate policy participation.  
 
Caveats, Limitations and Future Research 
 This project developed a method for ranking states by their level of involvement in 
policies that reduce carbon emissions and identified a set of important factors that can influence 
whether a state’s emissions rise or fall. However, there is a limit to how much these factors can 
actually predict the direction of a state’s emissions. This limitation stems from the basic 




New York State is an instructive example. It ranks high on the policy participation scale and has 
successfully cut its emissions thanks to a combination of factors like membership in a regional 
greenhouse gas cap and trade program and a moratorium on new coal-fired power plants. New 
York State also bans the controversial use of hydrofracking to exploit its natural gas resources, 
but the reasons for the ban are more about political calculation than environmental protection. In 
late 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo cited a report by a state panel on the public health risks 
associated with hydrofracking to formally ban the practice after five years of delaying such a 
decision (Kaplan 2014). Fracking in Upstate New York has been a contentious issue for years, 
with supporters arguing for the potential economic benefits that new energy jobs could bring, 
and opponents warning the pubic about groundwater contamination, health hazards from 
fracking chemicals, and the adverse impacts of heavy industry to small rural communities.  
While the ban appeared to be a victory for environmentalists opposed to fracking, in 
reality Governor Cuomo was biding his time to make a final decision because of his “political 
ambitions” (Mufson 2014). That is, Cuomo’s aspirations to run for president factored into his 
decision to ban fracking. Given the splintered approach to fracking in the U.S.—where Texas 
and North Dakota embrace it, and Vermont and Massachusetts outlaw it—Governor Cuomo held 
off on a decision until it became politically acceptable to oppose fracking on a national platform. 
The state panel that identified the health risks of fracking was the scientific, nonpolitical basis 
that the governor chose as his reason for the ban. Had the political winds been different, however, 
hydrofracking might have been permitted in New York State, with a resulting increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
The point of this example is to demonstrate that the unpredictable whims of local politics 




policies. While this project’s ranking system and method for identifying contributing factors to a 
state’s emissions trajectory are valid to an extent, this evaluation system is imperfect and does 
not account for the strong influence, and unpredictable nature, of political decision making. 
Indeed, the unpredictability of the politics of environmental policy decisions makes selecting a 
final “test” case unnecessary for this project. Choosing a test case and applying a range of 
emissions policy factors would ultimately be arbitrary and would not change the conclusion that 
political capriciousness will always be a wild card. Instead, future research should include more 
points of measurement to rank states more precisely, and should identify more factors that may 
determine the direction of a state’s emissions.  
The methodology of this project is appropriate for this type of further research because it 
easily allows for the addition of more variables to the evaluation schema. The system that this 
project uses to evaluate the states provides a baseline to show the general landscape of climate 
policy across the U.S. It is essentially a tool that other researchers can use and augment in order 
to assess the varying degrees of success states have had in reducing their carbon emissions. 
Moreover, further research could benefit from more longitudinal studies that examine policy and 
emissions trends over longer time periods and therefore gain a thorough historical perspective on 
how states adopt and implement climate policy.  
The recognition that political context will always have an important, sometimes 
unpredictable, effect on whether a state adopts certain climate policies supports the idea that a 
national policy would be a more efficient way to cut emissions. National politics are obviously 
also fraught with unpredictability and political calculations that can influence policy decisions. 
But shifting emissions policy to the national level would at least remove the small-scale petty 




policy differences in favor of an overarching federal approach—something the EPA is 
attempting to do since Congress failed to pass cap and trade legislation or a carbon tax—would 
also cut down on uncertainty and give more states the direction and resources needed to cut their 
emissions. This project is not a comprehensive evaluation of every state’s ability and willingness 
to implement climate policy. It instead offers a proof of concept that such a detailed assessment 
of the states is feasible (taking into account the whims of politics mentioned above) with a more 
extensive set of factors. 
It is important to note, finally, that while the results of this project suggest that a strong 
national climate policy to replace the hodgepodge of state policies would be beneficial for 
climate change mitigation, that is still a larger, more complicated argument that this project does 
not explicitly prove or disprove. It is reasonable to extrapolate from the findings that the wide 
variety of state approaches to emissions reduction—from zero action to comprehensive 
policies—is not the most effective way for the nation as a whole to tackle climate change. It is 
also rational to assume that a nationally coordinated strategy to lower carbon emissions would be 
preferable to the current disorganized system. However, we must be careful about making the 
leap from one extrapolation to the other. To be sure, the project’s findings imply an advantage of 
a national policy over a scattered state-based approach, but they do not unequivocally prove it. 
Ultimately, the results of this project should be used as a basic framework of recommendations 
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